Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Thomas A. Goudge, file 1 of 3

Typed "Digest and Commenary" for Thomas Goudge's seminar on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

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Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Thomas A. Goudge, file 1 of 3
author_facet Thro, Linus J.
author_sort Thro, Linus J.
title Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Thomas A. Goudge, file 1 of 3
title_short Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Thomas A. Goudge, file 1 of 3
title_full Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Thomas A. Goudge, file 1 of 3
title_fullStr Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Thomas A. Goudge, file 1 of 3
title_full_unstemmed Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Thomas A. Goudge, file 1 of 3
title_sort kant: critique of pure reason, thomas a. goudge, file 1 of 3
description Typed "Digest and Commenary" for Thomas Goudge's seminar on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
publisher Saint Louis University Libraries Digitization Center
publishDate 1946
url http://cdm17321.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/thro/id/26
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spelling sluoai_thro-26 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Thomas A. Goudge, file 1 of 3 Thro, Linus J. Thro, Linus J.; Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Kritik der reinen Vernunft.; Manuscript Typed "Digest and Commenary" for Thomas Goudge's seminar on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 1946-11-14 2016-12-19 PDF 84.2.3.14 02 Graduate School Materials 02 03 Toronto University, Toronto, Canada DOC MSS 0084 0002 0003 0014 http://archives.slu.edu/repositories/2/resources/203 Permission to reproduce or publish must be obtained from the Saint Louis University Archives. Saint Louis University Libraries Digitization Center text ENG Saint Louis University Archives K a,n to:' 8 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON [ .••TRANSL. MEIKLEJOHN] DIGEST and COMMENTARY Introduction Sections I -III I Of the Difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge. In point of time experience is the beginning of all our a knowledge. This expe~ience i~ knowledge of objects which is the product of the operation of our cognitive powers upon the data supplied by our sense impressions of objects. But is there not a knowledge quite independent of exper­ience and supplied by the cognitive faculty upon the occasion of sense impressions? The totality of our knowledge may be a compound of such a priori inowledge and the a posteriori know­ledge we derive from expeeience. The term a priori we mean not in the loose sense as it is commonay applied to what should have bee n understood from previous experience, but strictly as embracing only such know­ledge as 1s quite independent of all experience. Thus we op­pose it to empirical, experiential, a posteriori knowledge. Pure a priori knowledge includes no empirical elements, such as that of change in the proposition "every change has a cause." II The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in Possesion of Certain Cognitions a priori. Empirical knowledge exhibits no necessity, its obj~cts always appearing as contingent. Nor has it any but an arbi­trary universality which is an extension of validity by induc­Kant - CPR 2 tion from several cases to all. On the other hand, the a pri­~~xori jud@uent has the notes of intrinsic necessity and abso­lute universality, admitting of no exception. These two cha­racteristics, since they cannot derive from experience, but only from a faculty of a priori cognition, are infalnible cri­teria fOD distinguishing pure from empirical knowled~e. As such, they are inseparably connected with each other, although they may be applied senarately to advantage. Such being the criteria, we find that we do frequently make such pure a priori juegments (and consequently that we POSS3SS an apriori cognitive faculty). For example, take any proposition in mathematics. Or take the proposition "every change must have a causetf , in which the notion of cause so necessarily and universally involves the notion of effect that in Hume's explanation of the principle by association the notion of cause disappears entirely. Further, such a priori principles are the basis of all certainty and law, and consequently of the very possibility of experience. We conclude to the same faculty of a priori knowledge as the source of such a priori conceptions as space and substance and inhering-in-substance, which remain even when we have taken away all the sensible properties our experience connects III Philosophy needs an a priori seience to determine the Possibility, Principles, & Extent of Human Knowledge. By means of wholly extra-experiential conceptions many of our judgments rise i»to a transcendental plane where sense Kanb -CPR 3 experience can offer no safeguard from error. Yet in this realm 11e the noblest investigations of Reason, namely, into the problems of God, free Will, and immortality. Metaphysica, the science whose proper object these problems are, is dogma­tic, assuming at the start the ability of Reason to solve these problems. Now it is only reasonable that we should investigate how the understandin~ can arrive at these a prmori cognitions, how far they extend and What validity they have. Still, the ne~ect of such an inquiry is understandable: we are lulled into secu­tity in our metaphysical constructions by the success of one branch of our pure knowledge, the science of mathematics. For in this science, supposedly dealing only with objects and cognitions representable by intuition, this intuition can it­self be given a priori and could as well be a pure conception. Thus easily rid of the encumbrances of the sensible, we place full confidence in the power of pure Reason, erect our 8?ecula­tive edifices, then belatedly take thought for the solidity of their foundations. And well may we, for as we go on analyZing our original conceptions into a multitude of aDparently new conclusions, reason Unintentionally slips in other a priori assertions which are quite foreign to the analytic. These two modes of knowledge are the subject of our next section. COMMENT. Kant is an acute critic of his immediate predecessors, accepting some of their doctrines, rejecting others as running counter to what he considers simple evidence. He agrees with Locke and the empiricists that all knowledge starts with ex­perience, but not that the pure intellectual concept can be Kant -CPR 4 reduced to pa6sive sense impression: experience is not the only source of knowledge. As against Leibniz and Wolff, ex­perience is another sort of knowledge from the pnrely intel­lectual: sensation cannot be reduced to a confused idea. He accepts Humels critique of the principle of causality: it is not analytically demonstrable; rather, it is derived from experience, and its apparent necessity is contributed by some subjective habit of thought. On the other hand, Hume leaves unShaken his persuasion that we have universal and necessary knowledge of the physical world: if Hume sacrificed that, it was only because he looked to sense experience to provide what can only come from an a priorifaculty. Kant is convinced that metaphysics, if it is to have any validity, must be prededed by a critique. Now, granting the Gartesian starting-point and the self-sufficiency of reason, Kant was qUite right. For, if the metaphysical vagaries of the century fOQlowing Descartes's death had al­ways begun with the Cartesian assumption that reason can begin with its thought and reach external reality, it was time that assumption was put to the test. But therein lies Kant's greatest -and most unjustified.~'as,a\lIl1pt1:on: namely, that before the mind can think straight, it must be proved to be able to think at all. If he had sta.rted instead from the simple and inescapable evidence that things exist and that we know them to exist, such a critique ~ould have seemed not only unnecessary, but unp~ofltable and even impassible. L.Thro, S.J. October 31. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON: Introduction (cont.) IV Difference between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments. The analytical judgment is that in which the predicateis identical with the subject and is derived by analysis of it: eg, "all bodies are extended"; these I call explicative judgments. In the synthetic judgment the p~edicate adds some­thing not contained in the subject, as, "all bodiea are heavy". The former I reach a priori, becoming conscious of the necessityof the affirmation when I break down my concept, eg, that of body, according to the principle of contradiction. The latter include all judgments of experience, since I find that such predicates as heavy can be Bynthetized with my a priori notion of body only by the aid of observation. Thus the a poster1DD1 synthetic judgment 1s a contingent unity made possible by ex­perience, which is itself a synthesis of intuitions. But the synthetical judgment a priori cannot thus rely on experience. For example, in the pro~osition "everything that happens has a cause", the predicate cause" lies qUite outside the subject. What is the unknown X guaranteeing the necessity and universality ~ith which the mind connects the representa­tions of cause and effect to that of existence? Such a priori augmentative principles are the basis of our speculative know­ledge; the analytic can only clarify our concepts. V Synthetic a priori Judgments are Principles of all Sciences. 1. Mathematical judgments, always a priori because neces­sary, are likewise always synthetical -reference to the prin­ciple of contradiction does not make them analytic. For exam­ple, in the proposition 7 ~ 5 =12, neither 7 nor 5 nor the­Bum-of-7-and-5 contains the concept 12. Nor in the proposition"a straight line is the shortest distance between two points"does "straight" contain any notion of quantity, so that "short­est" is a pure addition and must be reached by an intuition rather than by analysis. Such analytical judgments as are ad­mitted in mathematics (whole =whole, whole is greater than its part) are rather links in method than principles, and are ad­mitted only because we are forced to add the predicate by rea­son of an intuition over and above our co~cept of the subject. 2. Natural Philosophy, or Physics, contains synthetic a priori judgments as principles. For example, "in material changes the quantity of matter remains unchanged", and "a.ction and reaction are equal". So too the other' p~opositions of pure natural philosophy. 3. Metaphysics, too, though only an attempt at science, not only contains synthetic a priori propositions, but really contains nothing else, since in it we seek to widen the rangeof a priori knowledge by means of additions to it. This is exemplified in the proposition "world must have a beginning." C.P.R. Introd.(cont.) VI The Universal Problem of Pure Reason Upon the solution to the question "how are synthetic a prlhori judgments possible?" depends the existence or downfall of metaphysics as a science. Yet up to now no philosopher has attacked the problem, not even Hume, who restricting his investigation to the synthetic principle of causality, con­cluded that such an a priori proposition is impossible. EVidently, his conclusion would destroy mathematics as well as metaphysics, since both depend on synthetic a priori propo­sitions. The answer to the above question willi at the same time show how the pure mathematical and natural sciences are possible. As for metaphysics, obviously it at least corresponds to a natural tendency rooted in our faculty of pure reason. The question here remains: is pure reason capable of reaching and judging an the objects it insists on invefstigating? That is to say: is metaphysics possible as a science? Now, the object of metaphysics is the extension of a priori knowledge by syn­thesis. Hence, ignoring the dogmatic attempts at metaphysical science which have always analyzed their way into contradict1ons, we must establish a critique of the reason itself. For, only by an inquiry into the nature of reason can we understand how it forms its a priori judgments, and whether or not they may valid­ly be applied to objects of experience and to knowledge in general. VII C. P. R. as a Particular Science: Idea and Division. This is not an Organum or system of pure reason (ie, a treatment of all the principles of a priori cognition and an extended application of the same) but a mere propedeutic to such a system, namely, a study of pure reason, its sources and its limits. Its use in speculation will be only negative, aiming not at enlarging, but at correcting and guiding our knowledge. This I call a transcendental cr~tique, understanding transcendental of all knowledge pertaining to the a priori mode in which we must know objects, if we know them at all. This critique does not pretend to be a complete system of transcen­dental philosophy, such as we may one day see: it is not the full examination of all a priori knowledge, but will prodeadwith such an examination only so far as to enable us to judge of the vaUdity of our synthetic a priori knowledge. It is ra­ther the kernel of transcendental philosophy than the science i tsel!. In dividing our study, we must exclude all empirical con­ceptions -it is the critique of pure a priori knowledge, for transcendental philosophy is a philosophy of purely speculative reason. Hence, there is no place here for the philosophy of morality, into which, although its principles are a priori, the concept of duty (as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an urge) brings the empirical notions of pain, pleasure, and the 1>. C.P.R. Introd.(cont) like. For all that is practical, insofar as it deals with impulses to action, pertains tomelings and cannot transcend the empirical. The general divisions of our science will be, first, a treatment of the elements of pure reason, and second, a treat­ment of its methods~ both with subdiVisions. Only note here that of the two sources of human knowledge, sense and undere standing, the first presents objects, the second things them. Now any a priori representations the faculty of sense may con­tain bring it under transcendental philosophy. The trans~cen­dental doctrine of sense must, then, be the first part of the science of the elements, since what conditions the given must be considered before what conditions the EmH~Xtx thinking of the given. COdMENTARY: If you accept Kant1s purely crrtical point of view, his zax classifj ~ation of judgments into synthetic a posteriori and analytic and synthetic a priori is new but perhaps not inde­fensible. True, the examples he uses to illuatrate the two kinds of a prior~ judgments are not particularly satisfying: why, for instance, Bhoui.d "extended" be contained in the com­cept "body" and ltheavy" not, since both extension and wmight are derived from previous experience of bodies? or does he mean to imply that a cognition which began as synthetic may so become part of the mind's a priori apparatus as to fur­nish analytic cognitions from then on? -in other words, does such a concept as body, by supposition a priori, grow by ac­cretion? Stili, taking them on Kant's own terms, the division and definitions of analytic and syn~hetic judgments are not self-contradictory. The former het considers tautological and valueless, as he considered Leibniz's reasoning by identi­ty or truths of reason tautological and valueless. The latter are his own attempt to raise Leibnlz's purely contingent truths of fact to the level of scientific knowledge. In these, the synthetic judgments a priori, he finds our only means of ad­vancing knowledge, because from his idealist point of View, extension of knowledge can only mean fuller appreciation of the fact that the objects we know are the distorted constructions of our own faculty of knowing, and never the real tLings out­side our minds. From such considerations as these one is inclinad to find Kant's frank definition of the object of metaphysics at least as ddgmatic as any of the dogmatisms he abominates. For~ in positing it as the extension, by synthetic judgment~ of our a priori knowledge, Kant has already closed off any escape from the mind with his a priori conditions. Consequently, the extension of that knowledge to the realitmes metaphysics aims to reach is already supposed to be illegitimate. Meta­physics takes on the aspect of a straw man Kant sets up in order to demolish it. I. L. Thro, sj.10-7-46 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON no. 3: TRANSCENDENT L ESTHETICS. Intuition, which thought shows is our only immediate relation to objects, is possible only according as the object is given to us, ie, affects our sensibility. Sensation is such an effect of object on this representative facutty. An intuition thus related to an object is an empi­rical intuition. Tse phenomenon (the undetermined object of an empirical intuition) has matter (content corresponding to the sensation and given a posteriori) and form (arrangemant of content under certain relation) given a p~iori by the mind). This pure form of sensuous intuitions in general existing a priori in the mind I call pure intuition. It has no real object of senses or sensation, but is onjy the resi­due of space and time, left when we subtract from the notion of body all the thought-forms (substance, force, divisibility) and sense-forms (impenetrability, color, etc.) we can. The science of transcendental esthetic is the science of the principles of sensibility. In it we shall first iso­late the sense faculty, or sensibility, from every conceptual addition, leaving only empirical intuition. Next, subtrac­ting sensation from this, we shall have only pure intuition, ie, the a priori form of phenomena. There are t~o such pure a priori forms of sense intuition, space and time. SECTION I - OF SPACE Me!!aJ2,hysic§:.l EXJ2o.§!.i1i.Q.n: ThrOUgh the "external sense11 we re- space, present objects as outside us, determined in shape, dimensions, interrelations. in The internal sense gives nofi object but determines the form under which alone the intuition of our mental processes is pessible, le, as represented in relations of time. Are space and time real determinations of things or do they be­long only to the form of intmition and so are purely subjec­tive? First, let s have an exposition of the concapt of space, ie, a clear representation of what belongs to the com­cept, and a metaphysical 8xposition at that, ie, manifestingthe apriority of the concept. 1. Space is not a representation derived from outward ex­periences, for this very experience of th~ngs outside each other is impossible without the representation of space. 2. Space is a necess"ary and a priori representation: for we can't imagine its non-existence, and it founds the very possibility of phenomenal knowledge. .,. L.Thro,s.j. Space (cont) 3. Still, space is not a universal concept abstracted from the relations of things, for it is essentially one, embracing all phenomenal diversity of spaces and seemlngmultiple only by further aex2 limitations. It can only be, therefore, a pure a priori intuition. 4. Space is represented as an infinite given magnitUde, ie, as a totality in which an infinity of parts ooexist, for any part can be extended without limit. Since this could not be true of a concept, the representation of space is an a prmrm intuition. Ir~n~c~ndegtal Exgo~i1iQn~ ie, one showing how a concept is a principle explaining the possi­bility of other synthetioal a ptori cognition. It must show, first, that certain synthetic propositions are derived from the concept and, second, that they are possible only id it is an a priori form. First, the propDsitions of geometry are examples of synthetic determinations of the properties of space. Second, they are a priori, for geometric propositions are always apodictic. Now, this character of necessity cannot ve accouned for if the propositions are derived from empi­rical judgments, nor, as synthetic, san they flow from a con­cept. Therefore, our representation of space must be the a priori form of the external sense, ie, the formal capacity of the subject to be affected by object, ad thereby of ob­taining LJlI1ediate representation (ie, intuition). Only thus is geometry possible as a synthetic a priori science. 1. Space represents no property of things in themselves no~ their interrelation~, ie, no determination attaching to the objects and capable of persisting even in abstraction from the subjective conditions of intUition;! for such deter­minations could not be a priori. 2. Space is the subjective form of all phenemena of the external sense, the receptiVity of the sUbject to them, the pure a priori intuition determining the elations of these phenomena. Because of this subjective condition the predi­cate, space, can be properly applied only to things as they appear to ~ ie, as ob~etts of sensibility, for the condi­tions of sensibility cannot be made conditions of the possi­bility of things, but only of their existence as phenomena.Only as limited by that condition is the proposition true that "all things, as external phenomena, are beside each other in space". So we conclude to the empirical reality, ie objectivevalidity of sapce as a determinant of phenomenal objects. L.Thro,s.j. 10-7-46 SPAcE At he same time, we must admit its transcendental deality. That s to say that as applied to objects which are consi­dered by reason as withdrewn from the a priori conditions of sensibility, space can have no vlaidity: for it xx is those conditions which make the very experience of those objects possible. Sppce is the only one of our representations, at the saIne time subjective and looking outward, which is strictly objective a priori, ie, a source of synthetic a priori proposit ons. No such traascendental ideality belongs to other subjective determinations of sense-perception: thus sight, hearing, feeling give us mere sensations of color, sound, heat; therefore they are not intuitions, and give no a priori cognition whate?er of an object. They ar9 subjective changes and may be quite different for each one who ex­perineces. But the transcendenaal ideality of space is a critical warning that what we call spatioal objects, unknown in themselves, areponly the representations our subjective form of sensibility gives in transforming the data of sensation. COI~ENT: There is little point in repeating the criticism of the immanentist presuppositions on which the critique and, consequently, the transcendental esthetic is based, nor in recalling Kant's assumption of the validity of the mathemat cal sciences. The only serious question I think can be raised here is whether or not Kant in his conclusions is denying the reality of the external things his a priori conditions should prevent him from knowing. He insists that space means nothing when app~ied to extended real objects, and repeats that space is ideal. Is this meant to be a re­futation of Newton's and Clarke's doctrine that space is a real thing, of Locke's that it is a property of real things,and of Lelbniz's that it is a relation of real things? If we cling to the meaning Kant should be conve ing by his space, the negation of the exterior world need not be implied at all in this discussion. The ideality of spaceis affirmed to be transcendental: so the discussion has no reference to the space of the realist. Rather, i estabillbes the existence of a priori spatial conditions, which inform all sense data, and by the very fact, rule out every sort of judgment on the sort of space admitted by Newton, Locke, and Leibniz. ~onsidered in this light, the transcendental idea­lity of sapce leaves the metaphysical problem of the reality of extended objects an open question. KANT CRITI~UE OF PURE REASON SECTION II ON TIME METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION: 1. Time is not emoirical but an a priori representation, for without it we could perceive neither coeXistence nor succession. 2. Time can be represented as void of phenomena, but phena can­not be represented as out of and unconnected with time. Hence time is a necessary and a priori condition of their possibillt~ 3. This a priori necessity of time makes possible apodi~tic principles 0f the relatams 0f time in general, such as time ~ f has only one dimension", "different times are not simul taneous ir/.",~<tH but successive~ Their universal validity precludes emp.origin. 4. Timeis a )ure form of sensuous intLUtionj not a discursive 'f >?a.«,,,Pj.j general concept. Different times are all parts of one time; but the representation which can be given by a single object alone is an intuition. Besides, the proposition on different times is synthetic; it cannot therefore come from a concept but must be contained in the apriori intuition. 5. That basic unlimited time conceived as limited toaagermi­naje length gives us the notion of infinity of time. There­fore, again, the total representation of times must be furnisht by an tntmitlon, for concepts can represent only parts and are themselves based on intUition. co~mNT: -As Kant remarks in the following section, this ex- 1'0sition is not restricted to the purely "metaphy­sical"; thus the le,st points he makes in justification of time as an aprlori form already ins1s on the synthetic judgments derived from it. -As before there is no sys­tematic proof of the necessity of this form, other than the one Kant derives from his own intnospection; and one is inclined to question the value of that proof as he gives it in no. 2: Obviously, pbBnomena cannot be represented as outside of time, since change and sucession ha1ebeen put in­to their very definition. And as for representing time with no pbenomenal content, I wonder how he does it. TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION: l().d.dt.J..:.. 2...-lw-J-..;....j. I-ot-:#3 ~ M-vt. ~p. ~. ~-The above is already branscendental. I add here a stri­lmkg example of the a priori synthetic knowledge this internal intuition of time makes possible. The notions of change and motion (change of place) would be ir-comprehenslble without this a priori intuition of time. No concept but only time as an a priori intuition can thus join in succession two contradictory determinations in one thing. j40n /vll~~~. ~ V'-X.-4 r~ ~.~r-:' IrJ ~ .:.... .s:pD<.~ ~~~ ~~~~~~-.~<-4­10M) ~ f..-tld, ~ K ~ffl{~ ~a...-tQ::J t.-.... (j.u*,,'~I".rAl'ck/£....q"'. II Nov. 14, L.J.Ulliru,5.J, 194c CONCLUSIONS 1. This tine is not a self-subsistent thing (it would be real bmt would furnish non real object); nor a determination in things -it could not precede and condition things nor could it be known wynthetically. But time taken as the inner subjective condition of all our intuitions permits its repre­sentation as prior to the obje~ts, ie, a priori. 2. Time is the fotnn of the internal sense, ie, of the tt· t3l.1:(J,<.' intu!rtions of self and our internal state; it represents no ::"""Y':::':iWIlshape or form. We represent it by analogy of line continuing ~~ to infinity and of only one dimension, and conclude from this ~~Jf~· to the properties of time. Further proof that it is intuition. 3. ~s contrasted with space which conditions Gnly exter­nal phenomena, time is the formal a priori condition of efufu all phenomena, since all, as d.eterminations of knowibedge, be­long to our internal state: thus time is the immediate con ­dition of internal, the mediate condition of external phenomena. Time means nothing if we abstract from this internal in­tuition and the external intuitions it makes possible. It is merely a subjective conditiOn of our intUition. But it has objec~ive validity and a priori universality in any judgment w.1ich takes account of that dondition. In this sense time is empirically real; ie, no object is presented to us in experience except under this internal con­dition. At the same time it is transeendentally ideal: ie, ndependently of its conditioning role in intuition, it cannot be considered as real in itself or as determining things-in­themselves. 1JY&Yt: 1 ,." rtAA-'..ww-'~J v~·:"·'iWfJ /< ,t.:.,iI-~ /frJ.WI~, l"'rir.J{tU; ~ COMMENT: l~ If this is meant to be a refutation ~ Leibnizian and Newtoni an views on time, its vdidit~y might well be questioned: until his adversaries admit Kant's definition ~ time as a subjective c~ndition af all knowledge, his arguments cannot very tmMgN well touch their position. 2. How does Kant justify his distinction between external and i~ternal forms a Driori? Since the internal intuition conditions every ~penornenon, what is to prevent their extensional as well as their successional aspects f~om being determined in one internal mold? 3. I can only repeat the comment made above on space: Kant.'s "transcendental ideality" of time should not prejudice the possible reality of things apart from the knower. He seems to me to be denying reality to the thing­in-itself only with respect to the knower's capacity of pro­nouncing on it -and this ~ite logically, since the a prioriforms necessarily condition any attempt to reach it. ('41~<:r"....(.~" .,"" ~~ <f~~'1~t~'"'­l~~ -: ~ ~~ ~<-h <r tt-; ~ ti ....... . ~~~, II- L.J.Theo, S.J. CPR -Tr.Esth. Nov.21, 1946. EXPLANATION (on tlme~ This objection mmade to the transeendental ideality ::~2:~** of time: the changes in our consciousness are real, with or without external phenomena; but such changes presuppose time; therefore, time is real. CONCEDO TOTUL Time is the real subjective fomm of our internal intution, ie, it is em­pirically real. But precisely because it is an a priori condi­tion we cannot apply it to things in themsel~es. ~e objectors forget that all we know is the phenomenon: the nature of the extramental rema~ns problematical, but the form of intuition pertaining to the object as known is certainly real. Thus, the validity of empirical knowledge is unshaken whether things in themsmlves have any. ~g~l such forms or not. On the other hand, if space and time are considered as real in things, they must I/. 1'.-..' be either (1) self-subsistent eternal and infinite non-entities ~~n,~~. containing all reality (thus the mathematical natural philoso-~~~~ phers) or (2) relations of contiguity and successsion abstracte~~~ from experience and con~usedly represented, and so useless as ~~~ basis for mathematical a priori propositions on real things (thus the metaphysical natural philosophers); for then the a priori forms are generalizations by imagination from exper­ience. The first view has the advantage of keeping the pheno~ menal sphere free for mathematics, but is embarrassed in ~~er) fields by the apriort forms of space and time. The second bypasses the a priori forms, deals with objects ona a purely conceptual basis, and can furnish neither a valid a priori basis for mathematics nor a means of synthesizing that science with experience. Space and time alone are pure forms of sensibility: Motion presupposes a bo~y mOVing in space, ie, empirical data; chabge, likeWise, presupposes the perception of successive ex­perience. Therefore, thanscendental esthetic contains onlySpace dnd Time. GENERAL REMARKS ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC 1. Recapitualtion: all our representations are ~henomena, sensation 1s unformed a Dosteriori matter to the a Driori forms of sensibility; so it is to the whole human race.. To call, then sensibility a confused representation of things in themselves falsifies: its very notion; eg, "right" has ~othing sensuous about it. The Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy ~s all wrong in distinguish£ng between the sensuous and the intellectual as between obscure and clear, a merely logical dis­tinction. The distinction between them is plainly transcendental (; and concerns their content and origin, not clarity or obscurjty. sensiblity gives no knowlegge at all of things in themselves. Beware of the merely empirical distinction between empiri­cal intuition (supposedly reyresent&ng the object itself, where­as it is itself really phenomenal) and the accidentals of the same intuition, as in a particular sense. aO~~NT: This seems meant to corresDnd to Lockels primary, and secondary qualities; Kantls answer to that distinction is clear enough: a real object (having every­thing necessary to perception, valid for all, related to sensibility in general, always seen as the same) as opposed to an appearance (accidental to perception of an object,valid only for indivmduals, related to special sense, ob­served from one point of view) is only a distinction within phenomena, eg, between raindrops and rainbow. ~1 In a final paragraph, to emphasize the certainity of the whm e of the transcendental esthetic, Kant gives a clear and cogent summary of all the preceding steps, repeating as he goes the old assumptions: the exclusive value of a priori ~yhthetic knowledge, validity of mathematical sciences, necessity for knowledge of active formatimn of an object. TI. In confirmation of the ideality of the external sense: intutional knowledge contains only relations (feeling and will are not cognitions) of extension, motion, and moving forces: therefore only relation of object to sUbject,and nothing of the thing-in-itself. ~:v. ~Aj ';"~~~~'IA,...,;~M~ ) ~r.tIj """SJv-V"< -0 L ,. ~Ah(;..t>"'-VW>{. , The same is true of the internal: relations of sUQcession, coeXistence, and permanence. So, no intellectual intUition , of the Ego Othe lack of spontaneously given multiplicity of representations proves that), but an a priori form molding the representations of the external sense. COv>~~T: At first glance Kant se~ms to be suggesting apper­ception of the Ego on the level of the esthetic. T I think rather hels merely forestalling an objection similar to the one treated above in his Explanation. III. The phenomenon is not mere illusory ap~earance, but em­pirical reality relating subject and. object. The contrary view, ie, m~ ascribing objective reallty to these sensuous intuitions, k~~ 1s what led Berkeley to conclude to illusory appearances (ie, ~~~ things dependent on non-entity, space), and should logically ~A lead to consider~mg one's own existence as mere appearance (be-E~~1~ cause dependent on the non-entity, time.) ComY>'t\:'~! (wU~"/(.J.. {(~tf<t U/Io-UL Y (M ," ..... ~~'b ~e-t;".P~ ~:.:~ 1~ ..~~ .:..." ]}J".k~ ,cJl~~ ~ Jt-.. <--. K"" f}.t" ......LV\c.J. "/;fle.t It IV. Only this view of space and time deliers us from the ab­surdities in natural theology to which real space and time as conditions of existence lead. There's no other alternative: either space and time are a priori forms of sensibility or they are beal in themselves and must dondition both the know­ledge and the existence of God. Probably nOHt only man, but all finite thinking beings have these forms of sensibility. But it does not cease to be sensibility by reason of that universality: it is still a derived (dependent) tntuition, not an originating intuition, <-­which, as intellectual, seems proper to the Supreme Being. CO!~~NT: The last remark certainly has no justification in the transcendental esthetic, nor, as far as I can see, has Kant's extension of his conclusions to other men, or to ~ll finite thinking being~: whoever they are. CONCLUSION: We have now proved how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. C:J."1AEN'r : ? Part II: !~NeC~NQEITT!L_LQGIC.!... I. DOGIe IN GENERAL Our two fundamental sources of knowledge are the mind's receptivity for impressions (intuition -by it the object is given) and spontaneity in producing concepts (ie, un­derstandi~g -the object is conceptualized in relation to the representation). Both are either empirical or pure according as sensation is or is not mixed with them. Neither alone suffices: thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts, blind. Distinguish Esthetic, science of the laws of sensibility. from Logic, science of the laws of understanding. Logic is twofold, general or elementary (laws of under­standing no matter what the object) and particul1r (for a par­ticular class of objects -so a propaedeutic to the particular science~). This general bgic is either ~ure and deals only with the a priori principles of unde~standing without regard to content or conditions of particular cognitions, or it is ~plled and concerns the use of understanding under oijr subjective empiri­cal conditions. Applied logic is not a canon of the umderstand­ing but deals merely with attention, doubt, the sources of error, and other concrete circumstances of the use of the under­standing. Pure logic is a s~lence: as general, it abstracts from all content and differences of object, has to do only with the IS' form of thought; as pure, it draws nothing from psychology (ie, from the empirical), it is a demonstrative and wholly a ~riori science. II TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. Distinguishing between pure and empirical thought we find place for another kind of logic, not limited. to the study of pur representations in function of pure a priori forms, but dealing with the origin of our cognitions of ogects. Note again that the transcendental includes only knowledge of the apriori possibility of cognitions and the a priori use of it, eg, the knowledge that a priori space is not of empiri­cal ofighm and the possibility of synthetic knowledge theongh it; so too the application of space to objects in general (limited to objects of sense, it is empirical). Thus, the dis­tinction of transcendeBtal from empirical pertains to the critique of cognitions, not to their rolation to their object. Transcendental Logic is this critical science of ~ure un­derstanding, concerned with the a priori conditions indispens~ to the formation and cognition of objects. (0 III. DIVrnION OF GENERAL LOGIC: ANALYTIC AND DIALECTIC In the \luestion "what is truth" we presuppose the de­finition of truth as "the accorda.nce of cognition with its object", yet we ask ~8r a universal criterion of tru~h. But with resnect to the content, co matter, of cognitlons (ie their r~lation to their objectsQ a universal criterion of truth s a contradiction in terms, since to be universal it must abstract from this varying content. O!, with respect to the form of cognition, the univer­sal and necessary laws of the understanding are the ultimate criterion of the truth of understanding; but since it does not gUErantee agreement of tho ght with the object, this logical criterion is only a necessary condition of truth in generaal. For, error can depend on the content as well as on t e fDrm of the cognition. Thus general logic, called Analytic, has its function as a negative criterion of truth. Illegitimately extended to judgment on objective truth, it is called Dialectic. Used by the ancients as a sophisitic logic of illusion, since it can teach us nothing of the content of cognitions, we use the term here in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion. IV DIVI8IeM of THaNse$NaENtAL LeGIC: ANALYTIC AND DIALEC'rIC Trans endental Analytic treats of the elements of pure cognition in the understanding, and of the principles neceSB aary fo thinking any object, and as a canon for judging of the empirical u e of the understanding, it is a logic of truth. Emplo~ed, however, as an organon to extend the pureunderstan­ding alone to the determination of objects and to judge syn­thetically, it is a dialectic. As a critique of such dialec­tical illusion we set up our Transcendental Dialectic. ie, as an expose of the invaliditj of any extension of understanding and reason beyond. their function of measuring the judgments of pure unierstanding. FIRST DIVISIO: TRal~SvENDEFTAL ANALYTIC Transcendental analytic is a systematic dissection of all our a priori knowledge into the elements of the cognition of the understanding. These must be l) pure, not empirical 2} pertainOng to understanding, not sensibility ~} elementany, not compound 4} complete, covering all ~ purepnderstanding. Book I; ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS Ch. T: CLEW FOR THE DISCOVERY OF THE PURE CONCEPTS ~ Instead of the welter of unrelated concepts we are con­8e% e~8-ef-±s-eega±t±eR-f 17 sc~ous of in cognition and which we may attempt to systema~ tize according to their exsension or their complexity, tran­scendental 9hiloso?hy offers a guiding pri~ciple for the discovery of the organic system of the pure comcepts of our understanding. Section I: LOGICAL USE OF UNDERSTANDING As contrasted with sensibility, which is intuitive and so depends on its receptivity of impressions, the understan­ding is discursive and spontaneously so: ie, its concepts depend upon functions, a functimn being the active unification of different representations under a common ,one. Now, these already synthetic concepts the understanding uses in its j judgments. The judgment is a mediate cognition of an object, since it is the apJlicatinn of a predicate (eg, divisible) which oovers many different concepts to a subject (eg, body) which 1s a concept representing a specified type of object. This ap~lication in the unity of jud~nent of representations of wider and as yet utldeterminted range to conceptions of objects already Inlown is the key to the discovery of all the p re concepts. 11' Section II LOGICAL FUNCTION @ UNDERSTANDING IN JUDGMENTS In our seanch for the primitive unifying functions of the judgment we f~nd there are forms of thought in the judgment, each with three subdivisions: 1) quantit~ of jUdgments (uni­versal, particular, singular); 2) quality (affirmative, nega­tive, infinite); 3) relation (categorical, hypothetical, dis­jqnctive); 4) modality (problematical, assertorical, apodictic). 1. The singular judgment is treated in syllogisms like the universal because the Dredicate is ap~lied to the whole subjecG. But taken not in relation to syllogistic laws, but with respect to its own extension (quantity), it differs from the universal judgment as unity from infinity, and so deserves a separate place in the table. 2. The infiite must be classified separately from the affir mative in transcendental ~ogic, which is interested not in the mere logical formula but in the truth content of propositions. Thus in the apparently negative proposition "the soul is not mortal" I really affirm the soul belongs in the unlimited ca.a.ss of im~ortal beings, ie, ex~ludlng the predicate from one class, I automatically include it in the opposite class. 3. The relations of thought in judgment are either those between two concepts, as P and S, or two judgments, a condition to a conditioned, or of several mutually exclusive judgments covering all the segments of a given circle of cognition. The diVision, therefore, according to relations: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive. 4. Mo~ality has to do not with formal content of jud3ments but with degrees of necessity ~ the assertion: the problematical eX9resses only logical yossibility; the asse~torical expresses logical reality or truth, ie, the proposition s in harmony with the laws of understanding; the apodictic expsees logical necess­ity, ie, the proposition IDS determined by those laws and has a priori value. COI~mNT: Most of this analysis seems to be taken over bodily from the terministic school logic of Kant's day. The introduction of the smngular judgment s~ems to have litele jus­ti~ication ~art from the needs of his system of categories, as he admits himself: to bring in the non-extension of the subject is to go beyond the consideration of the formal extension of the judgment. The same might be said of the infimite judgment under quality: whatever the implications of a negation may be, it remains' formally a negation, not an afi'irmation. Section III The PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING. IE, CATEGORIES ~ The manifold of a priori sensibility, which is the matter transcendental/logic must shape into objects, is subjected to a soontaneous synthtesis by the blind imagination.. The third step, a further reduction operated by the pure synthesis of the understanding, results in the necessary synthetical unity of all objects under the ~averal categories corresponding to the various log~cal. f,?rms of the judgment, and apJlying a priori, to objects of lntultl:)n. THE TABLE OF CATEGORIES: 2. Q,uality reality negation limitation 1. §6anti1l -BMX~~, ~IM~KXXt~¥ unity plu,irality totality 3. Relation subst. & acc. cause & eff. action & react. 4. I~odalit;:[ possbility & impossY existence & non-ex. necessity & contingence Unlike Aristmtle's haphazard selection of ten predicaments with his subsequent addition of five post-predicaments, these categories or predica:ilents, arrived at with necessity from the faculty of judgment~ as from a unifying principle, form an inte­grated and complete system of the fundamental pure concepts. By various combinations and deduction thes schematic list can be supp~emtned with subsidiary predicalbes. OBSERVATIONS useful for their application to speculative science: 1. The categories fal into two groups, the mathe:natical, which have to do with objects of intUtio~, and the ~ga~iQaX, having to do with the existence of such objects «fia in relation either toone another or to the understandi~g. 2. Although division a priori is dichotomy. the number of categories in each class is always three, eRe the thir~ arising from the combination ~ the second with the first (thus totality is plurality as unity, etc.) But the third is also ap~imitive concept (not deduced) because such combination requires a special function of the understanding. 3. The category of action and reaction (community), as the disjunctive in the table of logical functions, is the transcen­dental function by wfuich objects are coordinated horizontally by reciprocity (not vertically or in series as in cause and effect); it gives t~ing sexistence as correlated parts of a wholw. The sQholastic liens est unum, verum, bonum" is an illegiti­mate transfer of the categories of quantity, ~, unity, plurality, and totality, from logical requisites of all cognition to proper­ties of things in themselves. In every cognitLon theFe is unity of concept,A (qualitative unit}), truth in the deductions from it ,qualitative plurality), perfection in the accord of the pluralLy with the un~ty (qualitative completeness). So, too, in the other classes these three originally quantitative categories can be applied with similar modifications. Thus unity, truth, and per­fection are new categories. Chapter II: DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOPJES SAntion I: PRINCIPLES OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION The distinction made commonly in law between the question of right and the question of fact may be applied as well in the ~roblem of knowledge. As a mat~er of fact, we do use ma~ empirical concepts and, being able to check them by the facts, consider further juat~fication unnecessary. But the que~tion arises how is such determ"nation ~ the objects of experlenne by pri~ci;:)les of the understanding legitimate? Thep only possible explanation of the manner mn which a priori conceDts can apply to objects is the transcende~tal deduction A Lockian emDirical deduction of the categorles (or of th~ fonms of sBnsibilit~, for that matter) is mpossible, since they are not acquired from experience, but at most occa­sioned by it. Furthermore, such a deduction ~ the categories is absolute­ly necessary. It was eady to show bhat without~ the a priori forms of sensiblity no knowledge of extended and coexistent or successive objects was possible: the mathematical sciences testify to the indispensa~ility of these forms. But ehe cate­gories are not, as these are, the immediate conditions of ~N~Hgk~ all empir cal intuition. How, then, can the subjec~ive condi­tions of thought have objective? or, from another point of view, . how XN can they be shown to be conditions of the possib lity of all knowledge of objects? How can it be proved, for example, that the connection of cause to effect must be synthetically im90sed on the object of experiencej The issue cdnnot be dodged by recourse to daily experience of such connections among phenomena, the abstraction of the concept of cause from them, and the corroboration of its objective validity by that same experience: Lais subterfuge leaves unexplained the essential characteristic of our udgments on causality, namely, their universality and necessity. «O~U~ENT: Kant uses two ap~arently radically dl ferent form las rcf. end of second-last paragraph above] tD to express the aim of his transcendental deduction. One accen­tuat~s the objectivity of the categories, eg, "how subjective condltions d) thOUght can have an objective value." Here he eems to be concerned to establish the cor~espondence d) our knowledge and,its objective validity against the extravagan­ces of dogmatlc metaphysics. The other accentuates the neces~ity of the categories for the very ~~llx possibility of e~perlence. Here he ~eems rather intent on opposing the myopic Vlew of empir cism WhlCh, hot basing all experience in a necessary rational knowledge, was bound, as-he conceives it to end in skepticism. The two apparently divergent points ~f view are, I think but two aspects of the same problem. They find their answer together in the unity of apperception which by synthesizing the data of intuition under the categories guarantees both their objectivity and their necessity. ' l/ TRANSITION TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DE UC'l'ION I representation ~ the necessary means fo cognizing objmm~ects, it must determine su~h objects a priori. Now, we have seen that intuition has that relat on to phenomena: the forms of se sibility are a priori conditio~s of the possiblity of ohenomena. Can this same necessity be redicated ~ the cate ormms wi h respect to all objects asthought? If we can p ove this, namely, that conceptual experience is possible only theough them, we will have demonstrated the objective validity of the categories; for they will then apply necessarily and a priori to every object ~ experience. Locke failin to see this 1 nk between the necessity of the categories and their objective validity, tried to deduce them from ex)erience by inductive psychological aalysis. HU~l1e unders tood that experience cannot explain them, that an a prio i origin must account for them. But, not appreciating that they are necessary and universal impositions of the mind on eX.Jerience he, too, gave them an empirical origin: ie, they arise by internal subjective necessity as the result of asso­ciation of apparently similar experiences. Locke ended in unbridled extravagance, Hume in skepticism, since he found the faculty of knowledge untpustwort~y. We shall attempt a midJle course by determining the limits within which reason can safely and legitimately operate. By way of preface, the categories are concepts by which the intuition of an object is considered as determined in re­lation to one of the logical fWlctions of judgment: thus, for instance, the cate~ory of substance limits body in the cate­gorical judgment" 'all bodies are divisible" to the role of subject. Cm'IT'1SNT: Trant I s singling out Locke and Hume for ciritc sm here is, I think, important. He insists on the inadequacy of psychological, ind~ctive analysis of the prin­ciples of knowledge. At best it can make the objectivity of phenomena only a subjective necessity, which gives knowledge no objective valae at all. If our universal and necessary judgments had no better basis than that, Hume would be per­fectly justified in his skepticism. /F~J~ __!~,.,;., ~th~~ [SECTION ~, n. 11: ast hal (from referenc~s ~o Lock8 and. qume on) takes the place in the 2nd~ditian of th~s in the1st• :t" Three orimitive and irreducible sources (faculties or powers of the so~l) ~ake experience possible: thus the a priori syn­xKnKXM: oDaiR of the manifold is made possible by the sanses, the synthe~i9 qf it by the ima ination, and unity of this syn­thesis by p~ 'ffii1:.1ve apperception. It is the aanscendental, not the empirical, use of these powers which concerns us here, particularly the latter t~o. 1st edition: SECTION II. A PRIORI PRINC ~LES OF TH~ POSSIBILITY OF EXpTi'RIENCE It is quite mpo sible to ave an a prior' concep~ relat ng to an object unless it ~'ther be contained in-the concept of possible experinece or be composed of elements of possible ex­perience. ~lse, having no contact Qith expetience and no cor­respondi~s intutionep~, ~ could have no content. Such a con­cept woulQ be the logical form of a concept, but not the con­cept by w~ich things are thought. The pure a priori concepts, therefore, whether or not they contain anything anything empirical, must at least be pure a priori condit ons of possible experience. On that rests their ob ective reality. Consequently, to know how the cate­ories are possible we must discover the a prior condit'ons of the possibility of all experience. The pure concept of the und4rstanding is the expression of this formal and objective condition of ex)erience. Once I have such pure concepts, I can conceive objects which cannat be giv~n in any experience, because in joining the concepts I leave out same essential condition of possible experience (as in concept of a s_ irit) or because concepts can be extended beyond the grasp of experience (as in concept of God). Nut although the alements of a priori cognitions cannot be taken from expe~ience (because a priori), still they must al­ways contain the pure a priori conditions of a oosslble exoe­rience and the object of such experience; other;ise, ~ey could not be the means of thin:ing objects, nor could they even com~ to be in thought without the iven. Now to prove that no object can be thought except by means of the~ is already a sufficient justification of the ob­~ ctive, ~alidity of th'se pure concepts, or categories. But s~nce tnere,are other powers in play here besides theunderstan d~n , and SInce the po sibility of the elation to objects on the part of the understanding itself needs clarification we must fi~st ~xa;nine (in the"r transcendental natur , of c~urse) the subJect~ve sources constit~ting the a priori fOJndations of the pos:ibility of experience. . ,HeJ~.s~ntations cann ot be ea h isolated if they are to ~nd ~n" un~fle;]. knovreage. Thus, the syno-psls made oy sensible ~ntuitlo~ of diversity demands a corresponding synthesis; reCe?tivlty and spontaneity must go together to make knowledge posslble. }To',,' spontau8ity is the princ ple of a three<'>fold synthesis in every cosnition: 1) the apprehension of the representat~ons as modific~­tions of the Spirit (ie, mind -Gemuths) in intuitlon; 2) the r r~D~oduction n the ~a "nat ~n; 3) th3....... peco~ition in the concept. These svntheses lead to the three subjecti.ve sources of C03nitions,' which make posAi~lc the un~erstandi~~ ani thro ~h it all exoerience (considered as an em~irical pro­duct (;f the und.erstandin~") I. SYNTHESI S ()F' A??R~l-{SIJSION I I T~:'I'UIT ON. Nhatever be the source of our representations, they pertain to t e i~t~rnal sense as modifications of the spirit and are subject to X~X~~M~XXs~~~Xa~,~~MXIXaOCKXtiKsX~I 06rrelations ~ndertt~e. For the diversitv to be re~~esen~ed as suc~ there must be distinction of time~. Now, two things are required tor the unified intuition ~ such diversity· 8 cCAssive unfoldiYlg of the diversity, and thd.t cOlnprehenaion of the su~ces8ion which I call the synthesis of apprehension. This must be made a priori, ie, on non-emprical renresenta­tions, for without it we could nmt have a priori space and time, which are formed by synthesis of the diversit r fur­nished b)T sensibility. ,:) I1 S,{NT~-1EGlS OF R~PRODUCrION IN THE IMAGINATION ~~e empirical law of the eprodu tion 0 associated ~enomena can be explained only by an a priori o~inciple securin.. the necessarJ and synthetic unity of such phenomena. Inse:Jarabl,v linked wi th the s'rnthesis of a ,)'')rehension, this a prioV'ti r'::Droducttive wlnthesis by ima nation is a transcen­~ental function of the mind. It is a transcendental pnnciple of t'P;e DOSS i. bility 0 all cosnition J a Jriori as '\vell as emprical. III SY1\TTH'-"SIS OF FSCOGNITION IN HE CONCEPT ~ tho t a consciousness of the ob ect of thought in successive '1lo;nents, the reproductive function wouli live only un~elatej diversity: e n addition we arrive at J de fin l te nur.1ber" This co~sciousness uniting in one reppesentation the diversit.\T w ich pe ceived successitJely and repreduced need not al~aJs be conscious in the act. Yet it is always neces­sary. Conce~ts and wi h them the knowledge of objects would be im~ossible without it. What is an "object of ren.....esentations"? Not the nheno­mena, wricD are only sensible-re resentations. What is object as distinct from the knowled~e of it? It is not some ,eneric thin~-in-itself, an unknown X ~ecause we coul not determine such an object 'tlmth positive predi ates. 2·.lf ()'Jr thoup;ht of an ob ject . ncludes an element of necessity, ie, the necessity that our representations~ i~ order t~ refer a Driori to the object, have the unlty which constitutes the ~~ concept of the object. Clearly since the diversity of our representations of themselves ~ive no unity to the object, the unity constitutin~ the bject must be the fo~mal ~nity of. cone sciousness in the synthes· s of that dlverslty. ~lUS ~Jn­thetic unity is knowledge of the object. But thlsllunlty is itsefl subject to a condit· on or rule [that of affini­tv"-cf. ob jective deduct on , according. to whi ch th~ svnthesis of reoroduct50n of the diverse and its uniflca­tion in the concept are necessary. Thus we conceive triangle as ob ect when e have consciousness of the grouping of lines according to a stable Dat~ern of representat o~. This unity of rule limits all diversity to conditions renderin the unity of aD ercention oosslble. The co~cept of this unity is the eD~esAn~a~ion of the object. The concent is a rele of the kno edge of an object on cO:'dition that is he rule of th unity of the diverse of the reoresentations. This 1s Due because the co~cept is the conditi~n of the necessary reproduction of this diversity and of its sy~thetic unity. Nb. Vleesch. Nous savons 1) que la possibil te II, 230: d'une renroduction deoend de la presence-d'un emement i~entique, commun aux representations re~roduites, permet­tant leur susceotion synthetique sous cet element; 2) que cet element commun ne oeut @tre que la conscience idetique, reDrese~table dans l'ident1ee perlllanente de sa fonction synthitiqu.e, et qua la for~e determinee de cette conscience est celIe du conceot. 11 suit de la..•aue s1 l'intultion est ordonnee a nouvoir etre D8nsee selon les con­ditions de l'unite, elle devra suivre necessa ~emt la re~le que lui impose la forme necessaire de l'ap"ge cention, ie, la forme du conceot. The 1.1ni ty 0 conBC ousness, required for thinkinn; an object corresponding to intuition, demands the existence of the transcendental ~R~X~N princ ple (reason) I II. PRELIMINARY EXPLAN. 0 TqE POSSY OF THE CATEGORIES, AS A PRIORI COGNITIONS. Pl~rality of experiences means merely a plurality of nercen~ptions belonging as such to one ~eneral experienc . That unique e Jerience unit ng a 1 erceptions according to th~ lws of thousht is the synthet"c unity of phenomena by concents. If this unification were contingent, a ruultiplicity of nhenomena would never make an experience, and knowledge wou10 have n0 neces?ary connectiOn with objects. There would be only intuition without thought, and no knowledge. The a D~iori conditions of a possible experience are at the sarne t me the condi tions of the possibility of ob-j jects of experience. Now, since the cate ories are precisely the cond.itions of thought in a possible experience they make it nossible to think objects, and have objective valtlity. But the possiblility and necessity of these catego ies rests on the relationship of sensibility and, with it, of all uheno~ena to the i~inal au)erception in which every­thin must nec9ssarily conform to the c0nditions of the ~ universal unity of self-consc ie, to the ',:eneral functions of synthesis oy co"cepts W;ltthout such a synthesis by CO::T cents (eg, of cause) there would be no unity of c~nsc in the diversity of Dercentions, which would consequently belong to no experience and remain without object. These pure concepts are not of empirical o~i~in. Take the concent of cause: a posteriori we can £now that one phenomenom usually fol..ows upon another but there is no empiric~l guarantee of the necessity of that succession nor any ~rol,nd for concluding fro I the second to the first. If that is true, how does the principle of the affinity of the dive~se make sense? ie, how explain th~s principle according to Hhich the diverse phenomena in the object are capable of a constant and normal association? My explanation is simple: all ')henomena as represen­tations, belong to elf-consc. But numerical identity is insel)arable fro;n this consc (as transc a:~presentation) and that ilentity is a priori certain, because nothing is known eNcept oy means of the appe ceptionl Now, since this ijentity must Yltervene in the synthesis of the mani­fold of phenomena (ie, in order to be emoirical knowledge), the phenomena are SUbjected toAa priori cond.itions conformable to their synthes_s. But such conditions are rules or laws, depen~i~g on whether a divensity can or must conform to them. All u-enomena~ therefore, sin e the,'! are synt' esized accordg to laws, are ln a transc affinity. T:enc~ the ~ws of nature have an a pr ori necedsity and an is obJeCG1Ve yal.~ity, since the nature they pertain to not any thlng-ln-itself, but the synthetic unity of phenomena. This can only be th~ transcendental ap~erception. Emptrical ap~erception or self-consc" the r~sult of, de­term':..nations of our state 'n internal sens':?, 1S changlng, cannot give a permanent Ego. For vI at is necessarily :-e­presented as numerica~ly identical can~ot be so concelved by means of empirical data. Rat_er, l~ requi~es.an a ~riori cond tion making unified wxperlence pmsslble. This ~ure, ori~inal, unchan_eable unity of consc preceding all 'ntuitions and making possible every reD e­sentation of objects -this I call the transc a )~erceptn. Its num rical unity is the a priori principle of all uni­fication of object under the concepts, even under space and ti:ne. The union made under its laws of all the possible phenomena would not work if the mind in knowin the diverse were not cons ious of the identity of the function (apprhnsn) bj which it s -nthesixes the diverse in Eone cognition. T1'.is con, of self-identity is atthe same time a consc of the necessary uni y by synthesis of phenomena under concepts, ie, according to rules both making them reproducible and determining an object for them, ie, under an ordering concept. For the mind could not conceive a priori its own identity in t e di ersitj of its rpresentations without such a consc of the identity ~ the at by which t sUbjects to a transc unity the whole synthe is of apprehension and orders it accordic5 to a priori rules. ObleQt_ig 3ege~al All representations as such have objects, can in turn be obje ~s ~ others. The phenomena are our only immediate objec s. But these are themsel~es by means of the intuitions they contain, representations of the non-em~irical or transc object, ie, The Dure concept of th s ransc object (always reallv = X) giyes all ou~ emJirical concepts objective reality, not by its content obviously: rather it concenns only the unity that must be found in a manifold of knowledge 9.ua in relation to an object. But tr;is relation can only be the necessary unity of consc, an~ therefore 0 the synthesis of the mani­fold by me~ns of a common functinn of mind which is to join it in O' e re~·/\esentation. Since this must ae a priori to be objective, the objective reality of our emp rical know­ledge (ie, its relation to transc object) rests on this .trc~n.§.e~nQegt,?:l_l~w...:.. all phenomena (as snurce of our ob jects) must be orJered in synthetic unity by a priori rules whicb ~an r~late them; ie, all phenomena must fall under the unifying conditions of apperception, just as they must be conditioned bv space and t me in simple mntuition. Knowled e is possible only ~~ through this twofold conditioning. 27 (1st edition) Sectio!.1 III. B' u'~IOI' OIl' UN ERSTANDIHG TO OBJECTSAND A PRIORI KNOv~DEGE OF T~~ ...• [AuthoratltiveExposi tion. ] The subjective sources of knowledge (senses, imagination, apperception) are considered as empirical with respect to par­ricular phenomena. But each is an a prirori element making this empirical use possible: thus all parseptions have pure a priori intuition as princlp~e, associat~on has pnBe synthe­sis of imagination, empirical consc has pure appe~ception. To fo~low this combination of reppesentations to the point where converging they get the unity necessary to knowledge, we begin with pure apperception as their principle and neces­sary condition. This a priori peinciple is that of self4d~atity, consc that it is ~ knowledge =~h~ ~r§n~c~ngent§l ~ltL Qf THE I~NIFOLD IN ALL OUR intuitions: whatever experience we have-manIfesta-a-unlty-traceable-to this principle of transc synthesis. [Note: two levels of consc -the empirical "It! <liffering for each particular event, the transc "I", principle of synth of manifold. in all intuitions, valid for all human minds and justifyine; ths empirical. Absolutely first principle of know­ledge: that the multiple empirical consclousnesses must be rooted in a single self-consc, which makes possible their collective unity.] This basic synthetic unity implies anther a priori s~nthe­tic unity, that of ~h~ Q~e_p~o~u£tlv~ ~~the~i~ Qf_i~agiga~iQn, underlying and making possible the empirical s~thesizing func­tions of imagination. This productive synthesis 11 transcen­dental because required a priori for the transc unity of apper­ception to synthesize any space-time manifold. Pure !;nderstanding is the conjunction of apperception with this transc synthesis of imagination. Its pure concepts, the categmries, su~ply the unifying laws under which the pure synth of imaginatimn synthesizes the manifmld of sense-objects. Thus, the pure understanding by means of the categories is the formal, and synthetic principle of all experiences, and the phenomenadepend intrinsecally upon it. starting, therefore, from the empirical and ascending, we have: 1. the diversity of phenomena, ie, perception; 2. active synthesis of the manifold by imagination, ie, apprehension; 3. reproductive power of imagination (Without it no seriation of perceptions); 4. power of association \set rule of repro­duction); 5. [and here we hit the transc level] the objective principle of association ~ phenomena, ie, their affinity (necessary for associative function of imagination, and guaranteed bj the objectifying unity of ~pperceptlon; 6. The objective unity of all emprrical eonsc in a single transc consc is the necessary condition of all possible perception; so affinity of phenomeana is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in the imagination based a priori on certain rules (categories f). 7. This pure 9roductive synthesis of the imagination which makes possible the affinity of phenomena and their objective unity 28 [l4:st edition] in apperception and justifies the empirical syntheses, is what we call the transc function of the imagination. The two extremes, sensibility and understanding, need this transc function of imagination in order to yield objects of experinece. Such real experience comprehends apprehension, association (reproductive), and finally recognition of the phena . 8. This recognition of the manifold is achieved in conceptswhich make possible the formal unity of experience. and viith tiN. it the objective validity of empirical knowledge. These are the .c~t~gQrie.§. ---rules according to which the mamfold is synthe­sized into knowledge of objects. Thus, it is we who introduce order and regularity into the phenomena we call Nature. The objectivity of our experiences of Nature is guaranteed by the sUbjective conditions for the formation of ob~ects of knowledge. The understanding is the "p:ower of rules. The laws of nature are simply the objective aspect of its knowled5e considered as regulative. All empirical laws a~e simply particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding. )..~ ......,,<. [001+ JS1:: ~1 ,B~89rlJn~E 1£ l~l_IDa srlJ ce11i.1eut bo nol.1qeo~e 0,6 n1 • '1:>.i .1Jdole SOil rIJ 10 nOl j om;1 OBf £~J 9. '. Ii 0 B~rfJ rS~'l t";-·.c..rl...,Jer..:sb.cw bn {,j11161: nee ,8s.a:s"!Jxe oWJ sd'I 10 e "_i C:c ;':":':·1. oj '!S.D'!o . rrc .1.81I:r n:.t 10 rr IJorru1 ocr .¥·1.1 ,r! 1.nS(IBr<~q.G S"H ~s'':r;. .00 eone1.... 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'C L sjf1.6~.s ~ e1 o'!U ,s.'. 10 lr~t ,1 unl.tnl!,J·:c:~e....'fW snT .s8b I omI '10 ~ s'60 10 IT i 'CC"O e~'i';ac~co e~i \ir:i:£I:.:.8 e~_;, e ;..;j,r,n ic B\;.s1 edT ~ 8elu'! 10'!6 0 " l~:)i ':"~IJ.lA l[ .~·l1jJ..:l·.2..-~. a£ bo e.ble~l,.;o 9·b9i,·0n..'l: c 1: 10 j09qSS 1~ Dw.sl 9 '!.iJ( eriJ "10 aaol .srrlIT!'"1s et .sluolj'"1.Eq Xl tile s'.s a"·' 1 .(9:r.U.J.':3 !:,,'" u .... 29 ~I e­..... n......... TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRI~ .OF. EhEMENTS Part I: TRANSC AESTHETIC \ ~ . ..,__J.! -, ­Part II: TRANSC ANALYTIC Book 1: ANALtTIC OF CONCEPTS (p.14 above) Book II: ANALYTIC OF PRINCPPLES General logic, following the division of the higher cognl~ tive faculties (unde~standing, judgment, reason) treats in its analytic of concepts, judgments, reasoning -corresponding to the functions of undrstanding i~ generic sense. Abstracting from content and concerned only with the formal element of dis­cursive thought, this formal logica can set up a canon for reason without considering whether the knoledge kXK it has is pure or empirical, for by simple analysis of the acts of reason, it rules o~ operation can be discovered a priori. Transc logic~nnot follow this simple division, since it is restricted to a determinate content, ie, to pure a prtorl cog­nitions. It can give a canon of objective truth onl~ to under­standing and judgment, not to reason, since a trans~ use of reason, ie, an attempt to extend knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience, can have no bjective validity nor any canon of truth. The transc treatment of reason, therefore, is transc dialectic. Here we are dealing XXXN transcenedentally with thefaculty of judgment. The analytic of principles will be its canon for applying categores to ptenomena. Introduction: THE TRANSC JUDffi~ENT IN GENERAL 0{. TlA.h.$. Understamding in general is the powe~~ Judgment is the faculty of subsuming mder rule~, ie, of determining whether a thing fits under a given rule or does not. Now, general logic, abstracting from content, can only establish the formal IBBS of understanding: but to indicate how to subsume under such rules, it would need a prior rule, and such a rule could only be set up by the judgment. So, obviously, unlike the understanding which can be ~iven rules of operation, judgment is a natural gift which cannot be learned but oniy exercized. This is native wit, good sense; lack of it (stupidity) cannot be supplied by instruction, as erudition can be grafted into the understanding. When the physician, judge, or statesman, however erudite and conversant with generalities, is unable to decide whether a concrete case fits under the general rule he knows, this is due either to lack of judgment or failure to sharpen it by practice. 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Chapter I: SCHEMATISM OF PURE CONCEPTS For an object to be subsumed under it, a concept must con­tain what the object represents: eg, the roundness intuited in 'plate' is co~tated in the seometric concept 'c~nclet. But since the pure concepts and empirical intuition are hetero­geneous (eg, causality canot be intuitied) some intermediary is necessary, like concept and like phenoJnenon at the same time, both intellectual ans sensible. This intermediary, which permitsthe ap;lication of concept to phenomenon, is the transc schema. It is a transc determination of time, homogeneous with the category in being universal and ~priori, and with the phenomenonbecause time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. This transc determination of time mediates between concept and phenomenon because the concept contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold, and time, as formal co_dition of the con­junction of the manifold in internal sense, contains a priori a manmfold of pure intuition. We have seen that pure concepts, besides the function of understanding in the category, must contain a priori formal con­ditions of sensiblity (namely, those of time) to which the application of the concept is restricted. This restricting condition of sensiblity we'll call the schema of the concept in question. The schema is a product of the imagination distinct from the mere empirical UK image in being the representation of a general method of producing an image for the concept (eg, number in ge~al, as contrasted with particular representation, as of five points). Further, the im~ge is a product of empirical imagination, whereas the sch~ma is produced by the transc j,ma-';ination; it is the pure synthesis expressed by the category, an a priori determination of time suitable to each category. Therefore, in every case the schema will be an a priori rule in the successive apprehension of the sense-manifold. Time is the universal condition ~ the apprehension of objectsin space; by it we apprehend a spatial magnitude, adding units successively. Thus, the category of quantity is given an aobject. Number is a unity imposed on the manifold in a homogeneous in­tuition, because the apprehension of the intuition generates time. :fbuuq Time filled with sensa~ion is the schema of reality, empty of sensation it is the schema of negation. And since what corres~onds to sensation is the Dansc matter of objects as things­in-themselves, and time is the successive generation of quantity, there is continmtity between reality and negation. 31 'rhe permanence of the real in time is the schema of sub­stance, ie, the representation of it as substratum of empirical determination of time. Normal and regualar succession is that of causality. That of reciprocity is regular simultaneity of t~vo sets of determinations. For the categories of modalty the shhemata are: Possibility -agreement of what fills time with actual condi­tions (the real excluding its opposite,except successively); reality -eXistence in a definite time; necessity -eXistence in all time . • : The schema of the category of quantity con~&ins and represents the gen~ration (synthesis) of time itself, in the successive apprehension of an object; the sahema of quality the synthesis of sens~tion with the representation of time, or the filling up of time; the sch of relation the relation of perceptions to Bch other in all time; finally, the sch of mada­lity, time itself as the correlative of the determination of an object -ie1 whether it does belong to time, and how. The schemata, therefore, are nothing but a priori determi­nations of time acc:;rding to rules, ad these, in regard to all possible objects, folloWing the arrangement of the categories, relate to the series in time, the content in time, the order in time, and-fInally, to ~h! ~o!!:!Plerx-~r lot lij"ij_in-tIme.-­-$(, "1:.­.: Schematism of understanding by means of transc synth of imagination means smmply the unity of the manifold of intuition in the int~rnal sense, and thus indirectly the unlty of apper­ception. The schemata are ~he condition of objectiVity and significance in the concepts. Note, however, that, although the schemata of sensiblity are the sole agents in realizing the ategories, they also restrict them -ie, by conditions lying beyond the sphere of understanding(Viz, in sensibility). Hence the schema is properly only the phenomenan, or the sgn~iQl~ ~eQr~s~n1a1iQn_of ~n_o£j~c1 Y1_h~r~ !a0llY_\'11th ~hQ. Qa1e,gory. The fact that no concepts can be applied to the noumenon is additional verification of this conditioning and limiting influence of the sensible through the schemata. Without schemata, the categories+are ~erely functions of the understanding for the production of concepts, but do not represent any object. ~"1 ~eJGM L!~ fc.-~l-'lACA. ~~(...,-.~ C1: ~ o-v..~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~-~ / t-&k ~~~ / ~ ~~~ ~~r---/ (t~J ~~),-ft--vt-~ f4w-~4J.> fo !41-'-~ ~ hMVfF~~~ ~~~ e-~, - - - - - - - - 32 Chapter II: SYSTEM OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF PURE UNDERSTANDING Schematism is a general condition ~~r the use of cate­gories in synthetic judgments. Now, we systematize the a priori judgments by relating the table of categories to sen­sibility. So no justification of the princplies of trans~en­dental esthetic, nor b~ the principles of mathe~atical sC1ence, which also have to do with intuition, not pure concepts. We 'treat here the principle of analytic judgments only to clear the field for discussion of the synthetic. S,at~mn I: SUPR&~E PRINCIP~E JF ALL ANALYTIC JUD3~~NTS. Whether our judgments have content and relate to objects or not, they must not be self-contradictory. Therefore, the negative condition of all true judgment is the principle of contradiction: "No SUbject can have a predicate that contra­dicts it." Alters formulm.tion from "It is impibssible for a thing to be and not be at same time" to eliminate time element (eg, man who is young cannot be old) and to restrict the prin­ciple to its purely logical function: to be analytic the ppinciple must dany absolutely the possiblity of contradicto~ subject and predicate. Section II: SUP&!M§ PRlNCPLE OF ALL SYNTHETIC JUDG~mNTS Only transc Logic has to do with the possiblity of syn­thetic jUdgments: determining thi~ it achieves its task, ie, to delimit the scope of pure understanding. As opposed to the analytic, the synthetic Judgment must go beyond a given con­cept, comparing it with another. It requires therefore a third thing in which the two are synthesized. This medium is the complex of the internal sense (containing all our~ intui­tions) and its a priori form, Time. The synthesis of repre­sentations by imagination and their synthetic unity by ~pper­ception, in fine, the very possibility of objective synthetic judgments rests on the possibility of experience, m, upon the synthetic unity of phenomena, which arethe material presented for synthesis. Accordingly, the supreme principle of all synthetic judg­ments is: every object is SUbjected to the necessary conditions of ths synthetic unity of the mamfold mf intuition in a possible experience. In sum, a priori synthetic judgments are pessible when we apply, the formal conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of the i~agination, and the necessary unity of that synthesis in a transc apperception to a possible cognition of experience: the conditions of the unity of the possiblity of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. Section III: SYSTEM OF SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLES All principles, because necessary, mu-t be ascribed to the understanding, even the empirical laws of nature. These last, XKW~~ are mere applications of higher principles of understanding to particular cases given in exper~ence. 33 Besides such empirical principles we leave out of account also the principles of mathematics, which, though pure a priori are derived not from pure undersJanding leven though their objective validity and very possibility depend upon it) but from pure intuition. In applying the categories to possible experience, the synthesis is either m~tQe~a!i£a1 (directed to the intuition) ~ or d~namic (directed to the existence of a phenomensn). Of ~rW1).~se two types, the former is apodictill, the latter necessary also, but only mediately and indirectly, ie, under the condi­tion of empirical Ghought in an experience. Whence the dynamic have not immediate evidence. Our sys tem of principles, which are to be rules for the objective use of the categories, will natura~ly follow the table of categories: I. AXIOMS OF INTUITION II. ANTICIPATIONS III. ANALOGIES OF OF PERCEPTION EXPERIENCE IV. POSTULATES OF EMPIR. THOT IN GENERAL The first two sets of principles, corresponding to Quantity and Quality, are distinguished from the other two as the intuitive is from the ~is£uF~~Y~: they are the mathematical as opposed to the dynamic principles, maned so, not because of their content, but for their mode of application. I. AXIOMS OF INTUITION ...Pftincipl~: All intuitions are Extensive Quantities. Phenomena can be apprehended, received into empirica . consc, only through the synthesis of a manlfmld thrOUgh~tfle representations of a determinate space or time are generated; ie, thrO~lgh the comp<!lsition of the homoe;eneous. Now the consc of a homogeneous man~fold in intuition is the conception of a quantity. Therefore, all phenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities, because as intuitions in space and time they must be represented by means of the same syntehsis, thru which space and times themselves are determined. En extensive quantity is ~hat in which the reprezentation of the parts redaers possibre~tne representation of the whole. Every phenomenon must be that sort of extensive quantity, be­cause it can only be cognized in our apprehension by successive synthesis, ie, from part to part. It is therefore an aggregate. On this successive wynthesis of the productive imagination is founded the mathematics of extension, geometry. On the other hand, the self-evident propositions of mathematics, thOU~l synthetic, are particular (7 ~ 5 • 12), not universal like those of geometry; they are not axioms, but numerical formulae. Contra.st "a triangle cODsis ts of three lines, any tvlO together greater than the third", whene I exercise pur pDoductive imagi­nation and the quantities are indeterminate, With "7 ~5 • 12" By this transc principle of the math.of phenomena pure mathematics is rendered applicable to objects of exper­ience; without the validity of that application is not clear. What geometry affirms of the pure intuitions must be valid of the emDirical intuition also, since the latter is possible only through the latter. II. ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION Principle: in phenomena the real (ie, object of sensatkon) has Intensive Quantity, ie, Degree. Phenomena contain, besides the intuition, the materials for an object, ie, the real of sensation as a merely subjective representation, which,~ecause it gives us the consc that the subject is af~ected, we refer to some external object. Now, a gradual transition from empirical consc to pure consc is possible: in the latter the real is gone and there reamains only a formal consc (a priori) of the manofold in time and space; consequently there is possible a synthesis also of the production of the quantity of a sensation from it beginning ie, from the pure intuition (zero) apward, up to a certain quan­tity of the sensation. Thus we must ascribe intensive quantity ie, a degree of influence on saase, to all objects of perception, insofar as this perception contains sensation. Now, although there seems little chance of anticipating sensation (never cognized a priori, the proper difference be­tween pure and empirical cognition), yet there is in sensation in general something we can cognize a priori. This tHx~XXKB·is the anticipation of perception involved here. For between r'?ality in any phenomenan and negation of the same, there exists a continuous concatenation of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference of which from each other is always smaller than that bet,~een the given sensat~on and ~ero . .: the real in a phenomenan always has quantit" not extensive but intensive quantity, ie, the sort that is apnrehended only as a unity but in which plurality can be repres~nta~ only by aporoximation to negation. This property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the smallest possible, is called their continutty: eg, we cannot co!ceive either space or time composed of consti­tuent parts which are given before space or time. Such quan­tities are'rlowing!l, ie, the synthesis in the production of them is a progression in time. All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect both to intuition and mere perception(sensation-reality). In the fisst case, extensive; in the second, intensive. So all real~y in perception has degree, the receptiVity too is according toAegree • ., No perception can prove an entire absence of all realitJ in a ?henomenon: it is impossible to draw from experinece a proof of the existence of empt~ space or of empty time. ~~ transc demonstration completely does away with the supposed necessity of explaining differences of, eg, speci~lc graVity, by the hypo­thesis of empty spaces. 35 III. ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE Principle: Expenience is possible only the repr. of a necessary conneceion of perceptions. PROOF: Perception of itself gives no necess&ty to the phgnomenal mamiflod either of their existing or of their connection in time. This necessity must come fnom an a priori rule of synthesis of the manifold in time. Corresponding to the three modes of time ­permanence, succession, eoexistence -there are three rules of relations of time in phenomena according to which their existence is determined. These principles, the analogies of experience, unlike the mathematical axioms and anticipations of perception, have to do not with the construction of phenoffi0na, but with their existence and their interrealtionln this existence. Since existence cannmt be constructed, they are onl} regulative, not aonstitutlve. Cal~led analogies because like mathematical proportions in which if three terlns are known, the 'fourth is determined; since, however, in ph:illosophythe proportion is not in quantities but in quality, the unknown term itself is not given but on}y a rule leading to it and characteriestic marks of it. Along with the post lates of em9irlcal thought, these are dymanic (physical) principles, or regulative, ie, acting as rules for the connection of objects in a single system of e·xperience. (N.3.: Not regulative as the 'l'ransc Ideas, which give no knowledge of objects, only enable us to bring our knowled~e into a subjective unity.] A. 1st analogy: PRINCIPLE OF THE PERMANENCE OF SUBS'rANCE. "In all changes of phenomena, substance is perman" All phenomena exist in time which provides for them a sort of permanent substratum for their coesistence or succession: the per­manent, or substance, is our empirical re')e of time in which alone determination of time is possible. For permenence is the durable correlate of eXistence, change, and coexist~nce. ,When we speak ~ substance, we mean only what persists and abides in tlme. We contrast the permenent with changes of its phases. But substance is nothing apart from its modes or accidents: the fact is simply that change or alteration ca"not be understood exce~t in reference to something permenent. So "from nothing comes noth~ng" need never have believers in a first euase: it has to do only with phenomena, and is in accord with a key a priori law for the construc­tion of nature. Experience requires us to treat successive or simultaneous phenomena as pertaining to one substaatum: an indi?ensable c~ndltion of the very ~ossibliity of o~r knOWing the relatioB of simultaneity and succession or of thin~ing any object whatever. 36 B 2nd analogy: PRINCI}LE OF THE SUCCESSION OF TI~m ACCORDING TO CAUSAL~ "All changes take place accdg to the :kat connecting law of Cause and Effect." Every event which has come into being, ie, every change, is connected with, or follows after, another ev~nt. If the succession of t\'10 ;:>henomena is treated not as a mere sUbjective accident in our way of ap~rehending them, but as a succession of the phenomena them­selves, ie, if the succession is objective, there must be something in the antecedent which regulates the succession of the conse~uent. To regard any ev~nt as an objective occurrence, we myst always pre­sume that it is preceded by something on which it regularly follows. Such, then, is the principle of causlality: every event has its cause, ie, something on which it follows by rule and law. The justification of the principle of causality is that without it objective reality is inconceivable: bbjective experience ~ causa­tion depends on a relative fixity of two phenmena in the order of time. And, in general, every addition to empirical Knowledge is simply an extension of the dete~mlnation of the internal sense: this pro­gression ~n time determines everytring, its parts existing only in time as stages following one upon another. From this we see the possi­bility of cognizing a p~ori a basic law of changes, ie, the fcmmal law of the anticipation of our oapprehension. Here, however, the under­standing by virtue of the unity of apperceptiol offer the a priori , condition for the determination of position in time of all phenomena. Thus temporal sequence and antecedence as fixed by rules is the reason for which the logical relatiOn of ground and consequent is uni­versal and render objectively valid the eim_Jrical kno\vledge of relations of time. In sum: All prosress in knowledge is in time. This progressiondet:=:rm ,nes eve~"ything, and is not itself determ ned by anythine; else. From this law we can see the la1! that all changes are quantities which proceed through infinite degrees; this is only a ~ormal law, an anti­cipation of perception. C 3rd Analogy: PRINCIPLE OF COEXISTENCE ACCORDING TO LAW OF RECIPROCIry "All substances, insofar as perceived in space at same time, exist in a SLate of complete reciprocityoof action. " ­PROOF: The coexistence of substances in space ca::mot be cogni zed in expeience exaept under the ~recondition of their reciprocal action because 1-time is not an object of perception; 2 -the synthesis of aoprehension presents ~ercetions singly, not together; 3 -the category of the reciprocal sequence of the determination of peneomena is there~ore required for the objectivity of coexistence. 4 -the application of this category can be judtified anly becausethe position of pheno:1enon A in time is determined by phenomenan B and vice versa, ie, that the two are in relation of community of reciprocal action. 37 On the assumption that a number of substances were isolated and ~maglned to be separated by empty space, we could not tell whether one follows fr01 anoher or if they were ooexistent. Therefore, to perceiver coexistence, there must be a mutual determiB nation of Dosition in time. Bu~ the relation of mutual determination is precisely causality. Hence the. erception of coexistence depends on the dynamic community of SUbstances: all coexistent substances are in the relation of completer community of Beciprocal action. Without it a preception would be isolated -the chamnB of empirical reoresentation would not be connected. For con ection, the per­ception of one substance must make possible that of another, and vice versa. Note: time cannot apply immediately to an eXistence, bU~ must do so through the rules of the understanding. Now, nature is the whole of phenomena connected in the r existence according to rules. Some apriori laws make nature possible, namely, the la"\fs which make experience possible. The analogies represent the unity of nature, for the} represent the connection according to certain rules expressing the relation of tiii18 to the unity of apperception. Thhee dynamic relations making possible this connection of phenomena are those of inherence, consequence, and composition. These three anamogies of experience are therefore principles of the determination~ of the existence of phenomena in time according to the three modes of this determination: ie, the relation to time itself as a quant~ty (quantity of existence, duration), the elation in time as a series or succession, the relation in time as the complex of all existence (simultaneity). IV. POSTULATES OF Er~IRICAL THOUGHT I.. What agrees with the formal conditams (intuition and con­ception) of experience, is possible. 2. vmat coheres with the material conditions of experience is real. 3. That is necessary (exists necessarily) whose coherence is determined according to unlversal donditions of expperience. The relation of the Object to the faculty of knowledge is expressed in the categories of modality: possibility, reality, nec­cessity do not determine the object, but express its relation to the understanding and to ex)erisnce . .e'or the modal categories to have any relation to things, they must concern the synthetical unity of objects in possible cognition. p~~< Further, the postulate of the possibility of things requires that we conceive things according to the fJrmal conditions of expo That is to flay·, a zmu~: synthesizing concept would be empty without any refp-rencA to experinece, eithe~ as borrowed from it (emnirical concept) or as the a ~rlori gro~nd of such experiecne (pure-concept); the later belongs to experience since only t~s can it have an object Possibility is not guaranteed by mere absence of contradiction . tB~+ but only in the synthetic requirements of empirical congition of ~bject~: eg, a figure contained within two straight lines is made ~mposs~ble only by the necessities of space which is an objective realiw The postulate on cognition of the reality of things requires 38 perception (conscious sensation) not ef the object itself which is to be coggized, but at least that the object has some connection with a real perception, in accordance with the anaolo5ies of expo KSlJ,/;r­1 From the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to concluje it s existence. However complete the conce,t be, all you can know from it is that the experience is possible. The sole criterion of reality is perception presenting matter to the concept. REFUTATION OF IDEALISM Material idealism is the theory whiCh declares the existence of objects in space without to be either doubtful and indemonstrable or false and impossible. The first is Descarees's pDoblematiual idealism, the second the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley (space itself is impossible, spatial object are products of imagination). Since space is not a property of things in themselves (which it sets itself to refute) the ~~0m dogmatic idealism falls. ~he prob­lematical idealism is refuted by the demonst~ation that we have exp of external t~ngs, that our internal (and to ijescartes, indubitable) exp~ience is itself possible only under the previous assumption ~ external experience. Th~orem. The simple b'.;,t emp.i.rically deter:nined consc of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in spAce. P?OOF: I am conscIDous of my own existence as deter~ined in time. All such determination presupposes the existence of some­thing permanent in perception: this cannot be within me (I am deter­minaa by it), therefore it is something outside~ not mere representation Consequently, consc in time is necessarily is possible onl] throu~h the eX$stnece of real things external to me. Remark 1: The assumption of idealism that only internal experience is immediate is thus refuted. The very possibility of representing an external thing presupposes an external sense recei­ving ~ata; and internal experience presupposes this determination by the external. The "I am" without intuition of the external (and throughthat,intuition of the internal) immediately includes the existence of the subject, but no knowledge of that -so the whole experience fails. Remark 2: Determination of time is possible onl.}' through perception of motion in relation to what is permanent: but the only permanent is the matter given in intuition -not intellectual re­presentations such as the III amll • Remark 3; Don't conclude to the eXistence of particular external things from the need of external intuition: only that internal exp in general is possible only throush external experience in general, and that consequently some external things must eXist. The third postulate involv~~o~ere logical necessity, but material necessity in existence -hence it can not be known from concepts, but only -from its connection as cognized with the objects of perception, ie, according to the empirical laws of causality. Necessity regards oni.Y the elation of phenolflena. Such ;Jrinciples 39 as "ever}tfunp; that ha'pens is hypothetically necessary", "n~th-'.ng hap;Jens by blind caance", "necessity in nature is not blind are djnamical principles, but simply express the natrue of phenomena and coordinate D~enomena with the necessary synthetic unity of understanding. The question whether possibility is wider in scope than reality can b.e smlved a priori. First, tpe understanding has nothing to do with sych things, since, if it Han~ ¥~ would have no relation to our possible experience. Second, the affirmative answer rests on invalid arguments: it may seem that possibi11ty is wider t~an reality, si~ce something must be added to possibility to get reality. But this is impossibile, since outside of possibility there is only impossibility which cou~d be adied to it. Thirdlj, it is impossible to condlude that there is more than one all-embracing experience: that which is possible only under conditions which ar? themselves merely possible is not possible itself possible in any respect; and yet that is the only ground for discusslngthe question. As we shall see late~ absolute possibility (ie, possl valid in every res,et) is not a concept of understanding, but belongs to transcendental reasoning alone. "Postulates" above not in the mathematical sense, but to be justified in accord with the critique of the understanding. The principles of modality are, however, not objectively synthetical, but subjectively: they ap9ly to the concept of the thing (to the re-oresentation they contribute nothing) the faculty in which the concept originates. Thus the possible is what agrees with the formal conditions of experience; the r~al is what is connected with and determined by perception: the necessary is what is determined according to the concept by means of the interconnection of perceptions. These principles therefore predicate the proced.ure of the faculty; in mathematics a postulate needs no proof, because the prodedure wbich it states is exactly that by which the concept is generated. [Note: when I think the reality of a thing, I thing more than the possibility, but not in the th~ng -for that cannot contain more in reality than was contained in its complete possibility. But whi~le the notion of possibility is me~ely the notion of a position of a thing in relation to the unde''''standing (its empirical use), rea11ty is the conjun~tion of the thing with percention.J Gene~~l Remark on the System of Principles: From categories alone no synthetic proposition can be made. That contingent existences reqUire a cause merely means that we cannot thing the existence of the contingent without concept~ For .,ur knm-.rleclge to ave content, besides concepts 1.,e need intuitions, and external ones at that: eg, for the concept of substance to have a per~anent corres90nding to it, the external intuition is required, for space alone is )ermanent and determines trings as perment, where­as tine and all that is in int~~nal sanse is of itself in flux. ~hange requires the representation of motion as change in space. ~or change 1s the connections of opposite determinations in one existen~ . Summary: all principles of pure understanding are only a priori prlncipl~s of the possY of exp; to exp alone do all a9riori synthetialpropositl?nS apply and relate -indeed, their possibility itself rests entlrely on this relation. FIRST DIVISION: TRANSC ANALYTIC BOOK II: ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES CHAPTER III: GROUND OF DIVISION OF @EJECTS INTO PRENa & NOUma Questions: 1. must we be content with the content of experience as described? 2. how secure is our title to under­standing? We have seen that everyth~ng draws from the under­standing is applied in experience. The principles of pure und1 gboth constitutive and regulative contain only the pure schema of possible experience. These rules are not onjy Drue, but are the very source of truth. But from this investigation we le~rn only what we would have learned by the empirical use of the understanding. Still, this kn is important, since it sets limits on reason: the understanding can properly make only an empirical use of its principles and concepB. Such empirical use of, eg, concepts is anp8 ap~lication of them to phenomena; they are used transcendentally when referred to thlngs in geneal as to things in themselves. The onlylegitimate use i~ the empirical one: for a concept must both have the logical form of theoUght and have the possibility of there being presented to it an object. An object is gi ven only by intuition: eg, the principles and concepts of mathe­matics, though they are generated in the mind entirely apriori,have their significance in relation to phenomena. An abstraot concept must be made sensuous, otherwise it will be nonsensical. Mathematics does this by the constuI'ction of the gigure, or in the accumulation of a number. ~ua.ntity, or the "how many times ll of mumber is based on repetition, sansequently on time and the synthesis of the homogeneous in time. The same relation obtains for all the categories; even that of causality requires sensu­ous intuition for it to form an object, since the notion of contingent is meaningless without it. Now, phenomena are simply appearances considered as objectsunder the categories. Noumena is the name we give to thingswhich would be simply of the understanding (ie, cannot be given to us in experience) but would possibly be given to an intuition in another order. All our representations are related to some object by the undrstanding. Phenomena are ·only representations;the understanding relates them to something taken as the object of sensible intuition, and this is the transc object. B~ this we mean some thing, an X of which we know nothing and canknow nothing, but Which (as correlative to the unity of apperception) serves to unify the manifold of aense. This is not an objectof kn, but the representation of phenomean undr the concept of an object in genral. Thus, instead of representing an objectgiven to the undrstanding alone, the categories determine onlythe transc.object. The reason there cannot be a pure and yet objective use of the categories is this: sensibility is limited by the und'g in that we know that it attains only the way in which things affect us according to our sUbjective constltmtion. Thls result of the transc esthetic implies the notion of somth~ng6 corres­ponding to a phenornenaon in general: for :t3henomenonfl implies a relation to something which is an object in itself. 41 The concept of noumenon, therefore, is not a positive one: it does not mean a determined cognition, but the thought of a thing in general, ie, abstract~Qgfrom the form of sensuous intuition. For a noumenon to give an object, it is not enough to ~ee thought from all sensible conditions; one must also admit another, non-sensuous intutions by which such an object would be given -if such a thing is possible. But when thought is thus abstracted from intuition, we have no kn, because we have no object: we have only a form of thought, ie, a mode of determining an object. The concept of a noumenon thus obe&ined is a problematical concept: ie, one which contains in itself no contradiction, and which is connected with other cognitions as a limitation of given co cepts, but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. Such a concept is not self-contradictory; it is needed, too, to restrain sensuous intuitionwithin the bounds of phenomena, because intuition does not extend as far as the thought of the understanding. Thus, the field of the understanding problemati­cally extends beyond sensuous intuition, but not assertorically.THE NOUMENJN? THEREFORE? IS A MERELY LIMITATIVE CO~CEPT, ~~D HAS THEfEFORE ONLY A NEGAfIVE. USE. NB: In a positive sense the diVision of objects into phenomena and noumenana, or of the world into sensible and in­telligible, is anadmissible. As concepts, they can so be di­vided. And in a negative, or pDoblematical sense, the no~menen is not only admissible, but necessary~ it is not an intelligible object for us / it is only the sign of the limitiation under­standing puts to sensibility and to itself. The distintinction of sensible and intelligible as between the intuited world a~ complex phenomena and the same as thought according to universal laws is merely dodging the central question: doe we have a transc use of the categories? When we say that the senses represent objects as they appear, the understanding as they are, we should mean it in an empirical sense, ie, as objects must oe represented to us in the complete connection of phenomena. Unders anding and sensibility for us can determine objects only in conjunction with each other. In confirmation of the non-objective character of the pure categories, try to construct a synthetic proposition with them. Where is the third term which conn ects the concepts? The concept of)ne and merely intelligible objects has no princi­p3;es for their ap)licatl1ln: the problel1latical thought which they occupy serves only to limit the use of empirical princi)les without containing itself any object of cognition. 42 [TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEM~NTS Part I: TraaBcendental Esthetic Part II: Transcendental Logic 1st Division: TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC] 2nd Division: TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC INTRODUCTORY. I. Of Transcednetal Illusory Appearance Dialectic in our sense is a logic of a~pearance; not, therefore, a doctrine of probability, which is truth, only cog­nized on insufficient grounds, and belongs therefore in the x~g±E analytic logic. Nor must phenomenon and appearance be identified: for true or illusory appearance is not in the object, but in the judgment about the object. Hence, the senses do not err; they make no judgment at all. Nor can the under­standing err by deviating from its Olin laws. Error is caused sole~y by the unobserved inflence of sensibility on under­standing, in such wise that SUbjective grounds are con~ounded with objective. The process of detecting such influence is the transc reflection which resolves the composite operation into the simples of understanding and sensibility. Our COllcern here is not empirical illusory appearance but transc i~lusory appearance, which influences principles of pure understanding as used without being applied to experience. Principles applied within experience are called i@ID~n~n~; those which transgress these limits are transcendent -ie, such principles Which seem$/ to authorize-uso&€-overstep the bounds of experience. ~»~ogical illusion(ln question here) arises from a failure to attend to the logical rules; it disappears when the falLacy is exposed. Transcendental il­lusion, on the other hand, rests upon subjective principles, whth, even when they are ~posed still continue to decieve. An example is to be found in illusions of perception (eg, seeing the moon larger on the hoeizon) whicp persist even when one knows them to be illusions. There is therefore a natural dialectic of pure reason, whose deceptions reqUre constant watchfulBBSS. II. Pure Reason the Seat of Transc. Il~~sory Appearance A. Of Reason in General. All our lmowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, be­yond which nothing higher can be discovered in the hwnan mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought. Ehere is merely formal (or ligical) use of reason, ie, in which it makes abstraction from all contant of cognition. But there is also a real use, inso­far as reason generates concepts not borrowed from sense or und/g. 43 Seeking for a higher Mr conception of this second sort of redson, ie, the transcendental, we may expect, Bcording to the analogy of the concepts of the understanding, that the logical concept will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will present us with the cleu to the concepts of the reason. We defined the understanding as the faculty of rules; reason we may call the faculty of principles. Now, cognition from princp_es is that cognition in which I cognize the par­ticular in the gneral by means of concepts. The general cog­nitions of the understanding are not like this, for they rely either on pure Intuition -as in mathematics, or on the con­ditions of a poss ible experience -physics. A principle, then, is a dyntheitcal cognitio from concepts. How such a congition could apply to things in themselves it is impossible for us to know. As contrasted with understanding, which is a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by means of rules, the reason is a faculty for the procudtion of unity of rules of the understanding under principles. Reason, there­fore, never ap :~ies directly to experneice, or to any sensuous object, but to the undersGanding, to which it gives a rational unity. B. Of the Logical Use of Reason. Distinguish between the immediately cognized and the inferred: eg, betrleen "triangle=three straight lines" and 113 angles of triangle:: 2 rts.". In every reasoning or syllogism there is a f~1damental propo­sition, a second drqen from it, and the conclusion, which infal­libly connects the truth of the first with the truth of the second. Immediate conlusions are conclusions of the unders­standL::g: eg, from "all menaare mortal" follow immediately ~some men are mor"~l" and "no immortal is a man. It But "all the learned are mortal" is a mediate conlusion, for the concept of a learned man is not contained in the first propsition~. In every syllogism I first cognitate a rule (major) by the understanding. 2. I subsume a cognition under the condition of the rume (minor) by means of a judgment. 3. I finally I determine the cognition by means of the predicate of the rule (conclusion; -.: I determine it a priori by means of the reason. The differenct kinds of syllogism, therefore, are constitutted by the relations which the major prop (as rule) represents between a cognition and its condition: ie, the categorical, the hypothetical, the disjunctive. Reason is the power which tries to subject the many cog­nitions of the unders~and1ng to the smallest number of prin­ciples, and th~s to secure the greatest possible unity; eg, in finding the basic rules behind a given judgment, which might flow from several sets of premisses. C. Of the Pure Use of Reason. Can we isolate reason? if so, is it a special source of concepts and judgments, or is it only a subordinate faculty which gives logical form to cog­nitions of the understanding? The variety of rules and 44 and the unity of principles is aequired by reason: its pur­pose 1s to bring the understanding into harmony with itself. But this pr1nc1pleprescribes no law to objects; it contains no ground of the pess1bl1lty of knowing or determining them; it is only a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the content of undefstanding. The purpose of reason is to compare the concepts of the understanding and to to subject them to th greatest unity; never does it justify us in demanding such a unity from objects themselves. Does reason, then contain in itself a prior synthetical principles and rules? what are these principles? 1. meason (as seen in syllogizing) is not applicable to intuitions but to concepts and judgments. Its application to objects and intuitions of them is only mediate -theough judg­ments. The unity of reason, therefroe, is not the unity of a possible experience (as, eg, subsumed in the understa ndin~ under the concept of cause). ii. In its logical use, reason tries to discover the general condition of its judgment (conlusion~: a syllogism is simply a judgment produced by the subsumption of its condition under a general rule. Now, since this rule may be itself sub­jected to another (by prosyllogisms ad indefinit~~), the proper principle of reason in its logical use is clearly TO FIND FOR THE CO DITIO~~D COGNITION OF THE UNDERSTA~DING THE UNOO~DITIONED BY WHICH THE UNITY [f THE FOffi,lER IS COl PLETED. Now, this merely l&gical maxim can be a principle of pure reason only if with giVing of the conditioned is given the whole ~ unconditioned series of subordinated conditions, ie, that this conditioned gives an unconditioned object. But obViously it is a synthetic prlncple, for the analysis of the conditioned leads only to the condition, not to the unconditioned. Further, the synthetic )rinciples deriving from this higlFst principle v1ill be trar!scendent with regard to phenomena, ie, the prin­ciple is useless empirically. Our task in the transcendental dialectic, then, is to determine ",[hether the principle that the ssries of cOl,ditions extends to the undonditioned is objectively ,true , or not; ie, is this not rather a merely logicalprecept directing us to rise to cO~lition beyond the bounds of experience? We must find out whether this logical aim of reason at the highest }ossible unity has not been mistakenly regarded as a transcendental principle of pure reason which postulates completeness in the series of condition in objects. We shall treat therefore the illusions of pure reason under t\ofO heads: the conceJts or ideas of pure reason and the dlalecticalsyllogisms. - - 45 [Second Division: TRA1fSCENDENTAL DIALECIIC INTRODUCTORY. ] BOOK I: OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON The conceptions of pure ~ason, although a priori like those ofthe understanJing, areTobtained by reflection but by inference or conclusion. Note that the concepts of the under­standing contain only the unity of rerrection upon phenomena; by them alone are knowledge and the determination of an object possi~le, and so they furnish the materials for reasoning: they are objectively valid because they are the intellectual form of experience and are applied solely in that sphere. 0n the contrary, the conceptions of reason do not confine themselves within the limits of experience -even the whole of experience or even the whole of possible experience may be only part of their pretended object-matter. For the aim of rational conceptions is the cQm£r~h~n~iQn of what we know by relating it to the extra-experienctial unconditioned. (Contrast with concepts of understanding, which aim to understand perceptions within experience.) Section I: Of Ideas in General Rather than coin a new and perhaps confusing term, we shall attempt to fit to our meaning the term 'Ideas' as used by Plato. For him ideas are the archetypes of things. He felt that reason has a higher function than the study ofpheno­mena, that it naturally concerns itself with cognitions beyond the range of possible experience. The importance of the Ideas in Plato lies especially in the practical order, ie, in the realm of free action. His extension of their use to the speculative, and especially to mathematics, where knowledge is pure and quite apriori, will be of no serivce to us; nor can we follow him in his mystical deduction of the Ideas, nor insofar as he made them things in themselves. But in the moral order, however useful Plato's Ideas may be in determining ideals of Virtue, etc., since there is no question of deriVing such norms from experience, i~ from What is known to have been done, we must relegate the moral ideas to another study. But Plato saw XXXXX proofs of the orignin of ideas not only in the realm where human reason is a real cause, and the ~deas are operative as causes: he found his view held in the world of nature. Plato felt that no creature peffectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its sort. Such ideas are indiviudally, unchangeably and completely determined, and are the original causes of things; the whole of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to the Idea. Since, however, we cannot take the term Idea without careful delimitation, let us note its relation to the various meanings of representation, and so preserve its original signi­fization. Under the genus RE?RESENTATION IN GENERAL stand representation without consc and REPRESENTATION WITH CONSC (or PERCEPTION). Perception is either purely subjective (SENSATION) or OBJECTIVE PERCEPTION (or COGNITION). Cognition is either INTUITION or CONCEPTION, the former immediately related to an object and so singular and individual, the latter only mediately related to an object (by a mark common to several). A conception is either EI{PIRICAL or PURE. If the pure con­ce. ption originates in the understanding alone, it is a NOTION; if formed from notions transcending the possibility of experi­ence it is called an IDEA, or conception of reason. SECTION II. ef Transcendental Ideas As the I:£rnM logical form of jud.gments pDoduced the categories to direct the use of understanding in experience, so we may ex~ect that the form of syllogisms will contain the origin of the transcendental ideas to determine. the use of the understanding in the totality of experience. The functian of reason in arguments consists in the universality of a cog­nition according to concepts; the syllogism itself is a judg­ment XKX~X which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its condition. Eg, llCaius is mortal" is a prop obtained from experience. But this particular supposes as condition the general prop that all men are mortal. Hence in the conclusion of a syllogism a predicate is restricted to a certain object after having been thOUght in the major in tts whole extent under a condition. Hence, in the m~jor there is universality, to which there corresponds a totality of conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental concept therefoe is the concept of the totali~ of the conditwns of a given con dition. Now, only the undorlditioned makes possible the tota­lity of conditions, ad the totali~ of conditions is not further conditioned. Hence, a pure rational conception in general is the condept of the mx~t unconditioned -this is then the Idea. If we app~y this notion of the Idea to the three kinds of syllogisms, we get three sorts of general conceptions of the unconditioned: an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a su bject; one of the hypothetical synthesis of members of a series; one of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system. Since these three ideas correspond to the three modes of the syllogism, they have a necessary foundation in the na­ture of human reason, at least, as modes of raising the unity of understarlding to the unconditioned. Kant defines "absolutetf as he 1ntends to use 1t: not as considered-in-itself-and-1ntrinsecally, but as valid-in-all-re­specta, the greatest predicate we can useNegatively, the two coincide. asin the phrase "absolutel~ impossiblell ; but posit tivlely, as in "absolutely necessary'. not at all. Absolute necessity does not depend on internal ne essity, and is there­for not a sysnonym for it. The Idea, or transcendental conception ~ reason, has for its object the absolute totality in the synthesis of cond1­~lons, ie, the absolutely undonditioned. Reason, therefore, has a rel&ion to the understanding, for the purpose of directing 47 it to a certain unity, to collect into an absolute whole all the acts of understanding. ThUS, the objective use of the ideas is always transc, Kalka that of the o,reprinciplea of the understanding immanent. All pure coneptions af reason are transc ideas; they are not fictions, but natural and necess~ry products of reason When we use the word idea, we say much of ita object, but very little of its subject, ie, regarding its reality under conditions of experience; for the idea~ as the concept of a maximu.Ll, can never be completely and adequately presented in concreto. Since what corres onds to these ideas can never be adequately be given in experience, t is the same as if it were non-existent. In the practical order, mn the contrary,that which corresponds is given even though only partially;for the execution of an idea is always limited and defective: the practical idea, though indispensable for action, is never adequately praoticable -because a concept of absolute perfec­tion. S Saying they are "onl;yt ideas", we don t t mean they a.re superfluous. Though they do not determine an object, they do guide reason in its safer exercise. Besides, they may make possible a transition fY'om speculative to parctical concepts. For the present, however, we are considering only the specu­lative, transcendental use of reason. Reason is the faculty of mediated judgments, or of conelusion by measn of the sUbsumptionof the condition of a possible judgment under the condition of a given judgment. The rule predicates somethin3 generally under a given condition -the major, which is satisfied in a given case -the minor. The rule ,ilUSt then be considered as also valid in the parti­cular case. It is clear that reason reaches kn by acts which constitute a series of conditions (premisses). Now, everyseries, whose exponent (in the categorical or hypothetical judgment) is given, can be continued, and so we have a poly­syllogism. This series of reasonings can be continued either on the side of the condition thru prosyllogisms or the condi­tioned in episyllogisffiS. But the ascending series (deductions on the side of the conditions) must have a quite different relation to reason than the descending (on the side of the conditioned). For the conalusion to be possible a priori in the former case, all the conditions must be given; in the latter, there is only a potential regression -reason need never ll1quire ~hether the totality of conssqqences or inferences is possible or not, since the given cognition is SUfficiently established on a priori grounds. It may be tha case that on the side of the conditions the series of premises has a first or highest condi­tion, or it may not possess this and so be an apriori but unlimited series; in a~ case the whole must be undonditionally ture, if the conditioned inferred from the series is to be held as true. 48 Section III: System of transcendental Ideas Our present concern is transcendental dialectic, which myst contain the origin of extra-empi~ical conceptions and reasoning. There are three kinds of dialectical arguments, in each of which reason rises from the conditioned synthesis to the unconditioned which the understanding cannever reaeh. Our representations manifest three general relations, ie, either a relation to the subject, one to the object as pheno­menon,oone to objects of thought in general. There are there­fore, three ideas of these general relations: 1. the relation to the subject; 2. the relation to the manifold of the object as phenomenal; 3. the relation to all things in general Now, all pyre conceptions have to do with the synthetical unity of representations; conceptions of pure reason with the unconditional synthetical unity of all conditions. There are, then, three classes of ideas: 1. the absolute unity of the thinking subject, 2~the absolute unity of the series of the conditions of a phenomenon, 2. the absolute unity of the corli­tion of all objects of thought in general; -the respective object-matters of psychology, cosmology, theology, which are, therefo~e, transcendental sciences arising in the province of pure reason, or rather problems of pure reason. These three ideas, follOWing the clew of the categories, never relate immediately to objects but to concepts of objects. Reason ~rises to kex the concepts of the absolute unity of the thinking subject from the function which mt uses in the cate­gorical syllogism; to the totality of conditions L_ a series from the hypothetical sylligiso; and to the being of all beings fro:n the form of the disjunctive syllogisJ+l -a thought which seems in highest degree paradoxical~ No objective deductionof the ideas is Wossible; for they have no relation to any object in experience. The subjective deduction of them from the natureof our reason has been given in the present chapter. The sole aim of pure reason is the absolute totality of conditions, not with completeness on the part of the conditioned; for it needs the former only in order to present to the understanding an a prirori totali]y of condi­tions. The ideas, therefore appear only in the ascending series. That of an absolute unity of the synthesis of all consequences -for example, of all future events -is an arbitrary fiction. There is a systematic unity of connection among the ideas. From the cognition of self the reason seems to pass logically to that http://cdm17321.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/thro/id/26

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